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(1) 
INTRODUCTION 
Th e United States of America has enough nuclear explosives 
to allot tvvo tons of dynamite to every man, woman, and child on 
this earth~ The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, it's primary 
opponent in the · world's balance of power, and a nation vvhich has 
declared that irreconcilable differences exist between itself and 
every non-socialist country, has developed a similarly horrific 
arsenal. Both nations have appointed themselves as the protectors 
of vast spheres of influence and this has been accompanied by a 
great web of military alliances that have entaiied a vvorldwide 
ar~ed presence . Often the forces of each side are deployed so 
closely , they can eith~r bombard one another with propaganda from 
sound trucks or, on other days, hold up Playboy pin-ups for the 
enemy to oggle. Since World War II, the United States and the 
Soviet Union have engaged in an unabated arms race that has pro-
duced not only the enormous stockpile of nuclear weapons, but 
also worldwide comrtlunications networks that extend beyond the 
earth's atmosphere, ultra-sophisticated conventional weaponry, 
chemicals that produce instant death when minute quantities come 
in contact with human skin, and methods of delivering a warhead 
weighing several tons t o within several hundred feet of a target , 
after a flight of over seven-thousand miles at twenty times the 
speed of s01).nd~ 
All this would lead the rational thinker to conclude that 
the U.S . and the Soviets are certainly heading rapidly towards a 
( 2 ) 
rather destruc t ive war , an<}indeed he would only have to pDint out 
the militaristic tendencies of the human race to sUbstantiate his 
claims. Over the course of written history, some 3400 years , 
there have been only 23 4 years without war. Since World War II, 
armed conflicts have broken out · fifty-five times~ ai'1lple testimony 
to the. fact that mankind still seeks to redress his grievances 
by the sword . 
Yet the United States and the Russians have riot gone to war. 
Despite the hatred of the two systems for each other . Despite 
the high level of military capabilities and preparedness . Despite 
~he continual tension that has fathered dozens of confrontations 
which have produced more tensions. The fact remains that neither 
side has ever hurled even a small fraction of its nuclear forces 
at its enemy, much less a minor or major attack utilizing conven-
tional forces . 
It is the ultimate paradox in the nuclear age where paradoxes 
are the rule. The two strongest nations in the world arm them-
selves to the teeth so as not to have a war . Protective devices 
such as the anti-ballistic missile system (ABM) lesson stability 
while invulnerable weapons enhance it. Plans to reduce the se-
verity of a nuclear war should one actually occur are viewed as 
promoting the holocost that we all seek to avoid. Even moves 
designed to strengthen deterrent sanctions subjecting the attacker 
to more devastating destruction often have the opposite and end 
up making the possibility of an atomic 'Nar less and less remote. 
What it all boil s dovm to is a game betvleen us and them~ 
( 3 ) 
Each side is playing with its ov'/n set of ru~es and as such, the 
contestants have different ideas as to what constitutes an in-
fraction, but as in all games, each is struggling to stay ahead . 
However, what makes this nuclear weapons game unique is that 
neither side is willing to make the effort to defeat its opponent 
and thus bring the game to a conclusion. Each combatant is forced 
to play but is in the dark about the way to win and the very nature 
of the grunes decisive moments. In fact , there is a great deal 
of doubt as to whether a Victory is possible at .all. 
Franklin D. Roosevelt said that we had nothing to fear .but 
fear itself. Yet today, the game that has taken on international 
proportions between the Americans and the Soviets has remained 
peaceful precisely because of fear, fear that the slightest arrned 
confrontation between the two powers could escalate to the point 
of nuclear devastation for both sid.es, leaving no one a winner. 
No doubt the whole world has paid the price of sustaining the 
atmosphere of supreme danger and for sure one must wonder about 
the durability of mere mnrtals under such adverse conditions, 
however, the fact remains that great powers have never before been 
so convincingly deterred from plunging themselves and/or a great 
many other nations into war. It has been said that numerous 
issues would have led to bloodshed between the Soviets and our-
selves in the . pre-atomic age~ Furthermore, it should be kept in 
mind that under the shadow of the two nuclear giants, many other 
countries have either limited their military posture, such as 
We st Germany and Japan, or refrained from using their own nuclear 
\lveapons , even under pressure as is the case wi t h Israel. 
It is only natural that man should fear the uW{no~m, and the 
study of nuclear strategy leads us to an empirical blank. Except 
for the two small bombs dropped on Japan at the davID of the atomic 
age, no fission or fussion devices have ever been detonated out 
of anger~ But man has usually overcome his fear of the unknovYn 
and stumbled forward , and the question of why not here remains 
to be answered. 
The difference between man ' s past willingness to summon the 
courage to explore the unknown and his present unwillingness to 
use nuclear weapons can be explained by the · tremendous risks in-
vol ved ·with the latter. vrnat nuclear weapons have meant to war-
fare is that even though you may completely destroy your opponent , 
he may in turn be able to annihilate you despi t e the fact that he 
has ceased to function as a civilized society. The key word is 
'may'. If the risks were known precisely, one nation or the 
other could come up \-nth what it felt to be adequate safeguards 
and subsequently launch . an attack , however no one is quite sure , 
or for that matter, even remotely sure, about the consequences 
of the use of nuclear weapons and therefore , no one can be sure 
what risks need to be defended against • . It is precisely this 
grey area that forms the backbone of deterrence and insures that 
neither the United States not the U. S.S.R. will inaugerate the 
use of nuclear armaments, either tactical or strategic~ 
Our fear of fighting an atomic war is compounded by the in~ 
cre.dible awesomeness of hardware posessed by the U. S., and the So-
viet Union. A felt" exa.'!lples should suffice to show the scale of 
technological developments. One-half pound of pre s sure per square 
inch exceeds the force of a hurricane wind by a factor of two 
or three and five pounds psi will knock dovm a house. Yet to 
withstand an attack from Russian intercontinental'ballistic mis-
siles (reBl/Is), our Minuteman Ills have been placed in silos that 
can bear the force of one-thousand pounds per square inch~ Al,bert 
Legau~t and George Lindsey tell us that all the bombs dropped by 
Allied forces on Germany during the Second World War had the com-
bined power of approximately 1~300,OOO tons of TNT, or 1.3 megatons. 
As of 1974, the total number of nuclear explosives available in the 
world was equal to fifty-thousand megatons! 
Now our rational thinker woUld be led to believe that under 
the threat of such profound danger, both side s would not only 
agree to methods of avoiding war, but also 'would rest contently 
one they posessed forces , which cOTJ.ld deal out a few million cas-
ualties to each other. Painfully, as well as obviously, this is 
far from the case.. As for the United States , we don't really 
trust in deterrence8 and we don't understand the Russians so we 
push on VIi th newer and costlier developments, constantly increasing 
our military might whil e concurrently feeling that our security 
is decreasing? 
The Soviets are a completely different case because their way 
of thinking, attuned to the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, is in many 
ways fundamentally distinct from our own. I will discuss the 
numerous ra.mifications of thi s later on but in general, they have 
(6 ) 
thought in terms of what might happen if there was a nuclear war 
while the United States has built its strategy almost exclusively 
around the prevention of such a war~O At the present time, the 
Soviets are revelling in the fact that they have achieved essen-
tial parity with the United States but is is unsure to u s , and 
perhaps to them as well, as to what the implications of parity 
\'vill be. 
The purpose of thi s paper will be to arrive at some sort of 
understanding about the real importance of nuclear weapons in the 
hands of . the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., something which has not been 
done heretofore in as skilled a fashion as" is possible. There are 
a number of reasons for this, some of 'which are worth looking into 
hecause of the impact they have had on the actual policies of the 
United States. 
Many, if not most of the books and articles vrritten about the 
strategic ,balance come from the pens of military academicians who 
are prone to discussing weapons outside of the political frame-
work within which they are to be deployed. According to Uri 
Ra' anan in testimony given before the Senat e Subconuni ttee on 
'National and International Operations: ll 
Sure'ly, weapons systems and military power in general cannot, 
or should not, be evaluated except in relation to the overall 
political postures that they are meant to serve. ' 
Therefore, I especially intend to look at the likelihood of the 
various proposed sc'enarios actually taking place. 
Another problem with the literature on nuclear strategy and 
the nuclear balance between America and the Russians is one which 
(7) 
i s ha.rd to avoid in many are as of learning, namely, the author 
with his O~TI axe to grind provides a distorted view of things 
when he sets forth his ovm interpretations or conclusions. The 
result has been government officials telling one story, frustrated 
arms ~limitation negotiators another, and hardware buffs yet a third . 
Time and time again, alarmist authors wou~d serve warning about 
the numerous strides which the Soviets have been making of late 
and contend that we would soon be helpless against a massive attack, 
all the ", .. hile totally ignoring the fact that we have 41 near-in-
"-v~nerable missile submarines which by themselves are capable of 
destroying a great percentage of Russian society. It can not be 
ignored, as is so often done, that the United States and the Soviet 
Union have the power to destroy each other and furthermore, will 
continue to maintain that capability~2 This the basis of de-
terrence and all discussion about the nuclear balance must eminate 
from this. 
I have chosen to enter this debate. because I feel I can aD-
" 
proach it far more objectively than most. My mind has be en and 
remains open to all arguments and I have been under no pressure 
to rna.lee black and white decisions, a choice which professional 
writers ofnn seem compelled to make, but one which often does 
not do justice to all the variables involved. . 
Thi s study deals specifically with the Sbviet Union and the 
United States. I have touched upon the issues of proliferation, 
China, and the Third Vlorld only where they directly affect the 
relationship between the tvvo superpowers. While these three 
( 8 ) 
variables will exert more and more influence in the not too distant 
future, at present , they are subserviant to the strategic cons.id-
erations which the U.S. and U.S.S.R. attach primary concern to. 
Finally, I 'should mention that I assume the reader to have 
some basic lmowledge of the materials and concepts involved" I 
will however, stay away from the technical oversophistication 
that pervaded the literature and bombards one with cold facts, 
something which I believe contributes to our forgetting that even 
one nuclear warhead delivered to a major city would be nothing 
short of a disaster . 
(9 ) 
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NUCLEA...-q WAF,.-CHANCES AND CONSEQUENCES 
There is absolutely no way of knowing if nuclear weapo?.Ls will 
ever be used. Those who tell us to scrap our stockpiles because 
there is no possibility of its being used hold no less gro~dless 
assumptions than those Yiho propose that we arm to the hilt to fend 
off the impending onslaught upon our society. The best we can do 
in lieu of a crystal ball is to take a look at the crisis behavior 
of both sides, and in particular, the Soviet Union. Additionally , 
a brief discussion. of the consequences of a nuclear war is called 
for to place things in perspective. 
The physical destruction that would foli ow the use of nuclear 
weapons in a war between the United States and the U.S.S.R. has 
been dealt with in fine detail by a spate of authors, most of 
whom wrote during the panic-fille·d Fifties, so only a quick re-
hashing is necessary here. Each s,ide could inflict 100 milli.on 
casual ties on its adversary even aft.er absorbing a first strike~ 
If the United States attacked the Soviet Union with one-hundred 
megaton weapons from the many thousands it has at its disposal , 
the former could destroy sixty percent of the latters industry 
and fifteen percent of the population. Four-hundred of these 
weapons would knock out seventy-five percent of the U.S . S.R.'s 
industrial capacity and kill thirty percent of the population; 
the actual casualty rate from fallout and radiation would be . 
double~ It should be noted at this point that McGeorge Bundy has 
claimed t hat the Russians would be deterred from launching a 
(11) 
nuclear attack if 10 of their major cities and perhaps as little 
as one or two were destroyed? 
If Vie reverse the tables and look at the results of a Soviet 
attack upon America, therfigures are equally horrifying if not more 
gruesome because of the concentration of the population in a few 
large cities. A singl'e 20 megaton device exploded over New York 
City would kill 6 to 8 million of its residents and ~other million 
people in the Greater Metroplitan Area~ For that matter, any city 
with one million inhabitants subjected to the detonation overhead 
of a megaton bomb or warhead would stand to lose 360,000 people 
killed and 90,000 more injured according toa United Nations 
study~ Even if the Russia.ri$ chose to attack only our missile 
,-
silos and spare the American population, a maximum of twenty-t'v'lO 
million people could be expected to die~ 
This leads us to ask if the living would envy the dead. While 
several ,individuals have suggested that an all,-out nuclear war ' 
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union would render the Northern 
Hemisphere uninhabitable, this is simply not true! Both nations 
could survive a nuclear hOlocost~ despite the fact that the ozone-
layer of the atmosphere would be seriously depleted causing crops 
to be killed, a change in climate, a drastic increase ' in skin 
cancer, and the inducing of intense sunburns after only a few 
minutes out of doors? In the event that twenty million people 
were killed, a total economic recovery could be achieved in about 
10 years. However, if 80 million died, ' it would take the survivor$ 
fifty years to regain their previous standard of living. It would 
(12 ) 
take one-hundred years to undue the hell of 160 million Americans 
dying in an atomic Armageddon~O 
Yet despite the horror of the actual attack as well as the 
pain of enduring the secondary effects caused by damage to the 
environment and the various associated biological deviations, it 
seems that the survivors would be able to carryon. Says Herman 
Kahn: II 
Despite the widespread belief to the contrary, objective 
studies indicate that even though the amount of human tra-
gedy would be greatly increased in the postwar world, the 
increase would not preclude mormal and happy lives for the 
majority of survivors and their descendants . 
This fact notwithstanding, it seems that both the U.S. and Russia 
would, after a nuclear exchange, have lost their positions of world 
power, a price neither . of them is willing' to pay. Even if the 
damage to one of the superpowers exceeds that of the other(allowing 
the Soviets to rebuild their society in twenty years while it 
takes us thirty), any .subsequent long~range advantage will have 
been achieved at intolerable cost . 
There are obviously dozens of solid reasons why the use of 
nuclear weapons would not be in the best interests of the United - . 
States or the Soviet Union however I wish to touch on one which 
has the most ramifications , namely, the question of proliferation'~ 
Herman Kahn has argued that onee "nukes are used, every nation 
will try to get their hands on some.,,12 Indeed, six countries 
have already detonated atomic or hydrogen devices and a substan-
tial number of others have the requisite scientific knowledge 
within reach. It is generally agreed to , by both the U. S. and 
the Russians, that the proliferation of nuclear weapons consti-
tutes the greatest threat to world peace as maintained by the 
bipolar balance of power. Not only will these nations no longer 
be burdened by the taboo against crossing the nuclear threshold, 
their unleashing of these weapons against any opponent will pro-
vide the easiest way for · the two superpowers to slip into a stra-
tegic war that they both hope to avoid. Even if one assumes that 
America ~~d Russia can m~~age to stay clear of third party wars, 
the instability that will ensue will be to the detrement 6f both 
of us. The fact that powers such as India and France merely po-
sess nuclear capabilities which have never been used has proved 
destabilizing. 
The literature on,atomic warfare, in addition to postulating 
the probability of such a war and its likely physical effects, 
has also tried to construct meaningful scenarios regarding the 
course of battle once deterrence has failed. Only recently have 
the fortune tellers realized that nobody can be sure of what will 
happen once the nuclear threshold has been crossed and. that this 
very uncertainty is what has kept us alive. 
It has been claimed that the first use of "nukes" will be 
vigourous but that after the initial exchange, there will be an 
13 . 
immediate ad hoc cease fire. On the other hand, last year, 
George Kistiakowsky told the Senate Foreign Relations Comm.'ittee 
that: l4 
••• once a nuclear exchange begins, to convey to the other 
side conVincing information which the other side will accept 
as to where you will stop, will not be possible and there-
fore, the other side will necessarily respond and I think 
(14) 
the whole thing will escalate . 
Others have stated that once the threshold is crossed, both sides 
will withhold some of their forces so as to be able to engage in 
controlled escalation and war-bargaining, however this suggestion 
is also of dubious validity because the Russians, at least in 
their vrritings , have rejected war':"bargaining either through con-
trolled use of de-escalation15 and have instead opted for a pol-
. f 1 h . 16 1CY 0 aunc -on-warn1ng. This means that as soon as the Soviet 
early warning network detects an attack by the United States , 
they will launch their retaliatory forces rather than gat"Ilbling on 
their missiles and bombers riding out the onslaught . 
The U.S. has been deliberately ambiguous about its ovm inten-
tions , and it has always stopped short of unconditionally ruling 
out a launch-on-warning policy. For one thing, this type of 
response is a clear invitation to Armageddon and secondly, it is 
rather risky because if the other side becomes. convinced that it 
can bypass or destroy our early warning systems, they may be less 
inhibited about launching an attack. As a corallary of this, if 
the President believed that our forces were vulnerable and there--
fore should be launched on warning, he could be prompted to "press 
the button" too soon!7 
As it stands now, we have tried to sustain a strategic pos- . 
ture that will enable us to ride out a Soviet first-strike and 
f ld ' b k " t I· "t· 18 allow us the option 0 ho 1ng ac on our re a 1a 1on. 
The ability to hold back retaliatory forces that have survived 
an enemy attack is an extremely important one because as long as 
(15) 
the losing side has escalation options, the winning side or the 
side that has initiated the hostilities can not push its opponent 
t o desperation~9 In fact, if we assume that the damage from a 
first wave of nuclear strikes would be imbalanced among the com- . 
batants, then the weaker side might have a better positon from 
which to bargain. This further paradox of the nuclear age has 
been described by Richard Rosecrance in his excellent study of 
t t " d ,. ~ 11 20 s raeglc e~errence as IO ows: 
Suffering the greater civilian damage and perhaps also the 
greater redll:ction in its land-based missile forces, the 
weaker side might threaten escalation of the strikes to 
bring a substantial proportion of the enemy's population 
under att·ack. At this later stage, such a threat would be 
more credible than at the beginning of a conflict. The 
disadvantaged side, with its back to the wall, could claim 
that because of the attrition of its ovm force and the 
suffering of its population if could no longer guarantee 
to spare the opposing population. 
Thus it would follow that the side better off would cease its 
hostile actions to preserve its victorY and spare its people 
from a nuclear holocost . 
Anoth.er reason why we are unsure as to exactly what will. 
happen during a nuclear war is that a whole set of scientific 
phenomena associated with the use of fission and fussion devices 
exist that can not be sub j ected to study. It is presumed that 
an offense cov~d set of a very high altitude megaton burst which 
would cause a large and sustained plasma cloud, effectively hiding 
"1 .&> 1 ~ 21 subsequent missl es .Lrom ong-rangeraaar. Similarly, it has 
been reported that cominunications between missil.e submarines 
( SSBI'is ) . and land-based command and contro·l networks would be 
(16) 
j ammed by a few large-scale detonations in the ocean. 
It is pro.bable that the electromagnetic pulses (ErvIF) gener-
ated by nuclear explosions will have a sUbstantial effect on the 
conduct of atomic warfare , but as in the above phenomena, how 
much is unknown. EMF can penetrate launch facilities as well 
as hardened silos to destroy electronic equipment and completely 
erase computer memories, even if the supporting structures with-
stand the blast overpressure~2 This is associated with another 
process called fratricide which serves to limit the number of 
missiles which can be deploye.d against a single target in succes-
sian. 23 According to Rosecrance : 
when a numoer of incoming warheads are targeted an a rela-
tively dense cluster of ICBM silos, their explosions cause 
crater debris, shock waves, and nuclear clouds which reduce 
accuracy and penetration of subsequent warheads. 
Additionally, fratricide, if it did defl ect subsequent missiles 
by high winds or cause their heat shields t 'o burn maturely t might 
simply disable their warheads so they could not ex:plode~4 Of 
course, this process will also work to thE}'fletrerrien-t of the country 
being attacked because these same dynamics would pprevent any of 
the besieged missiles from being launched, something referred to 
as the pin-dovm effect . 
As I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the least 
inconclusive method of discerning the chances of nuclear war is 
to study crisis behavior because it is assumed that such a conflict 
will eminate from a great heightening of tensions rather than out 
of the blue, a prospect which will be discussed. later on. 
Because crises will tend not to be exacerbated if supported 
by preoedence and observable thresholds~5 it can be said that the 
present balance is stable in a crisis-stability sense~6 Even 
though one side or the other may be perceived as posesSing a 
strategic advantage, assurance and morale are more likely to be 
the guiding forces behind a nations crisis behavior, not military 
superiority~7 It is confidence that allows one nation involved 
in a crisis to threaten irrational punishment to an adversary 
that, while it could lead ·to onels own destruGtion, it necessary 
to prevent the outbreak of war~8 ~y virtue of the fact that theSe· 
threats are naturally ambiguous with regard to timing, substance, 
and so forth, it is easier ~or one or both countries to back off 
from a "risk of warn rather tha.l1. a certain threat, and thus avoid 
crisis escalation~9 
It is in a crisis situation that the issue of force vulner-
ability achieves the most prominance. If a nation feels that a 
certain portion of its offensive weaponry is susceptable to being 
destroyed if the enemy launches an attack, its confidence will 
be seriously eroded and the likelihood of its making a rash move 
that cou~d ignite the tension into war is greatly increased~.o In 
other words, if the risks of not striking are very high, the -vul-
nerable nation will not . be deterred, even vvi th substantial de-
terrent sanctions}l Clearly, a pre-emptory attack prompted by the 
seeming imminence of an all-out war, whether motiVated OlJ.t of 
weakness or strength is not the wisest course of action. We must 
(18) 
always faver .our hepes that a helecest can semehew be averted 
because both the Soviet Unien and the United States have ~much 
megatennage, that a pre-emptery attack with the purpese .of reducing 
the subsequent damage te .oneself ceuld still net prevent aweseme 
destructien tc beth sides~2 
Befere mcving 'en te a discussien .of the crisis behavier .of 
the United States and the U.S.S.R., .one mere paradex sheuld be 
peinted .out. That is, the incentives te reduce tensiens may be 
mere than .outweighed by ether censideratiens, namely, that the 
natien which makes the friendly moves tewards cenciliation is 
likely te get a bad bargain that will weaken him and thus endanger 
the overall balance. Thus, Herman Kahn states that a natien cen-
ceeding eneugh te substantially ease a crisis may find itself 
backed inte a rigid .or desperate positien~}This has many impli-
cations fer arms control that will be discussed later. 
The question of ris~-taking prepensities and crisis behavior 
, of the two superpowers is one which has baffled students .of inter-
national affairs since World War II, ' particularly wi th regard to ~ 
the Seviet Union vd th its penchant for secrecy and s,eerningly 
contradictory foreign pclicies. In the post-War period, it has 
been the Soviets who have ccntinually tested and prcbed cur cc-
hesion and determinaticn~4 acticns which seem consistant with 
their belief. in taking the initiative. Therefore if 'tVe accept , 
as I shall, that the risks which lead to crisis . which in turn 
lead tc armed conflicts ar'e more likely tc eminate from Russia 
(19) 
than from the U.S., a strong emphasis on the formers behavior 
is called for. The act:l.ons of the United States will be tied in 
throughout the discussion so that a complete picture should emerge . 
While we normally attribute less rationality to the Soviets 
regime, studies have shown that they have been just as cautious 
as us in crisis behavior~5 And if one makes the distinction be-
tween a crisis risk and a war risk, which the Russians d016 it 
can be seen that even their risk-taking has followed a distinct 
and rational pattern. Jan Triska and David Finley, in their 
Soviet Foreign Policy, did an in-depth survey of all Russian 
military and diplomatic moves sincEYChe Second Vlorld War and they 
discovered that inspite of common beliefs to the contrary, the 
Comniunists had only taken low risks, and in';general, had acted 
in a cautious, deliberate , and rational manner~7 They reported 
tha.t : 38 
The stronger the other partY ' in crlsls, the greater the 
geographical distance' from the U. S. S.R., and the greater 
the stakes involved, the more cautious the Soviet crisis 
response .. 
Triska and Finley have stated, as have others, that the Russians 
will challenge tough but that they will always cease their manip-
ulation and withdraw from the competition when the risks of war 
become evident~9 
While the Soviet Union may share the trait of rationality 
with the United States , it goes without saying that their process 
of risk-taking .and crisis behavior is very different from: our 
40 own and it may be that the real reasons for their taking and 
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accepting risks may not appear at all in the Russian literature~l 
However, Hannes Adomeit has authored a thor.ough study of Soviet 
behavior for the International Institute 6f Strategic Studies and 
has suggested tha.t: 42 
In Soviet perceptions, the use of force and the acceptance 
of risk in this process are subject primarily to criteria 
of expediency, not legitimacy or morality. If Soviet mili-
tary power can 'objectively' serve to further Soviet state 
interests, and thus, by definition, strengthen world so-
cialism, the accepta.71ce of risk is considered a priori as 
I just'. 
The Soviet view of world affairs has their relationship with 
the United States continually operating in a hostile environment 
and therefore risk-taking is built into the Communist system, 
bridled only by external forces~3 However, the way in which the 
Soviets perceive these ,external forces, such as the United States 
has acted to restrain their daring. In particular, the Russians 
have placed a great deal of faith in science as a means to~vards 
obtaining power, and thus , they have had to respect both the 
technological achievements of the U.S. as well as it's economic 
strength~4 Thus, it should be kept in mind that although the 
Soviets like to take. the initiative and freely engage it: activities 
that we could consider risky, these are by no means automatic 
as their failure to respond to our mining of North Vietnamese 
harbors testifies to~6 While the U.S.S.R. has proven to be 
extremely opportunistic, their risk-taking and crisis behavior" 
can not be interpreted as bringing us closer to the perils of a 
world war . 
The question remains as to how the United Stat es should act 
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so that it can counter the Soviets and do so in a way that will 
keep confrontations low-keyed . Past experiences in Berlin and 
Cuba tell us that "only by the calm deployment of unacceptable 
risks" can we force the Soviets to back down in a way that will 
guard against crisis escalation~7 Some people have argued that 
in the event of a serious crisis that had reached war-risk pro-
portions , bombers could be .sent on overflights as a warning48 
but thi s could be judged dangerous for two reasons. First, if it 
was shot dO'iiTI by Soviet air defenses, this would . undoubtedly be 
viewed as provocative by the Americans and the situation would 
only be exacerbat~d. Secondly, given the Russian emphasis on 
defense of the homeland, any incursion during a time of crisi s 
would b e escal-atory~9 . 
While any discussion of what constitutes calm yet unaccep-
table risks to the Soviet Union is obviously contingent to a 
large extent upon the 'particular circumstances of the crisis , it 
can be said (and I shall elaborate on this in the chapter on 
future deterrence), that any moves on our part must, through a 
credible chain, lead back to our strategic forces. In other words , 
the Soviets must be made to believe that no matter how small our 
response to their challenges, if they chose to stand up to us 
rather than yield at the sight of our displeasure , we coul.d even"':: 
tually resort to a nuclear attack. 
In the past few years , it has been generally agreed that 
the U.S . S. R. has achieved virtual strategic parity with the United 
States , a s ituation presumably, that could alter the nature of 
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Soviet risk-taking and thus force a change in our policy of dealing 
with these initiatives . Triska and Finley reported back in 1968 
- 50 
that: 
the greater the Soviet weapons-military parity with the 
West, the lower the Soviet perc.eption of risk in actual 
East-West conflicts . 
Adomei t , writing in .1973 , was unable to substantiat~ . , this, claiming 
that th~re has been no correlation between increa~ed Soviet mili-
tary might and her risk-ta.-1ring propensities, but that .in fact, 
there had been no real test for this proposition~l Continuing 
his analysis, he addressed himself to the foreign policy experts 
who had declared that the newfound Russian power would ma.-1ce them 
less , a.-~d not more inclined to take risks. He writes: 52 
... the political ~plications of military parity are not 
altogkther clear, nor are the dirctions of future Soviet-
American relations. The analysis of the significance Of the 
Soviet naval expansion and the strengthing of the military-
strategic and conventional potential of the Soviet Union 
proved inconclusive, and while the tendency of the present 
Soviet leaders to create, exploit, and manipUlate risks of 
crisis has declined, it has existed in the past, even in 
conditions of military-strategic inferiority. The argument 
advanced on that basis-that parity will now ffia.-'ke them more 
secure, 'more reasonable', and a priori less inclined to 
take risks-is not entirely convincing. 
Adomeit concludes that the Soviets are now engaged in a 
process of learning from their ovm past mistakes which have often 
been counter-productive as well as from the U.S . mistakes in 
Southeast Asia., and that because of this, they vvouid rather. avoid 
military confrontations altogether and sh~pe the milieu without 
manipulation of the risks of war?3 While this would make , it 
tougher for the Russia.."1.s t o show strength in the future, they may 
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more than make up for this by a weakening of U. S. resolve that ' 
would accompany our perceptions of such a situation as detente . 
In concluding this chapter on the chances of nuclear war, 
I wish to point out what many observers feel to be the most prob-
able avenue to an atomic holocost: human error or accident. While 
it i ,s useless to speculate on what kind of unforeseen circumstances 
beyond the control of the United States and the Soviet Union could 
lead us to a nuclear conflict, ,a tenuous situation involving the 
commander of a Polaris submarine who is eXperiencing an unexplained 
communications blackout is not difficult to imagine. This one man, 
if he perceives the need to launch his missiles, could lead us all 
down the road to destru.ction~4 George Kistiakowsky, before the 
United, States Senate Foreign Relations Committee" termed the danger 
of our slipping into a nuclear holocost via the "back door" as 
" quite significant,,~5 
America and the U.S . S. R., realizing the profound importance 
of containing human as well as mechanical error, signed a treaty 
in 1971 to reduce the chances of' accidental war. Among the pro-
visions of this agreement is a pledge by both signatories to 
notify each other immediately of any accidental launches or de-
tonations~6 
The improved communications between the two superpovvers 
during times of crisis should also help to reduce the chances of 
·either the U. S. or the Soviet Union becoming involved in an all-
out war subsequent to the use of atomic weapons by a third party. 
(24 ) 
It has been suggested that Communist China , in an attempt to force 
a confrontation betvveen the two superpowers might launch a cat-
alytic attack, the scenario of which has the Chinese firing an 
SLBM (submarine-launched ballistic missile) towards the Soviet 
Union from a position just offshore of the United States. This 
is unlikely because available tracking and detection methods would 
recognize the nationality of the attacker, however other scenarios 
involving Third World powers or even bands of terrorists become 
more and more real as the nuclear cluhbecomes less and less 
exclusive;>7 
To summarize, the chances of our becoming involved "in a 
nuclear war with the Soviet Union remain a great unknovm which , 
serves the cause of deterrence. Neither the U.S. nor the Cornmun-
ists has been inclined to provoke serious crises that clearly 
run the risk of escalating ·into war because the uncertainties · 
of such international .tension are no less feared by the super-
powers than the uncertainties of a war itself. While some may 
argue that " danger clarifies a man's thinkingll~8 it is widely 
recognized that crisis characteristics include an accelerated pace 
of events, difficulties of coordination and control, dangers of 
misperception, and inaccurate communication, and th.at even a .wor-
king out of the "rules of the game" by Viashington and Mosc ow is 
unlikely to harness the unexpected hazards of a real V'lar?9 
Whether the Soviet achievement of paritYt or as some see it, 
~uperiority, will affect a change on their thir~ing is not now . 
kno\"In and in any event, they ' have done very poorly in post-World 
(25 ) 
War II crises and such factors as asymmetrical interests," commit-
ments , and levels of resolve should continue to determine the out-
f · t .. t 60 come 0 crlses , no superlorl Y. 
( 26 ) 
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR CAPABI,LITIES AND PERCEPTIONS 
Since the end of the Second World War, the people of the 
United States have believed that our posession of nuclear weapons 
has served as a deterrent against the use of these devices by the 
Union of . Soviet Socialist Republics. In this chapter, I wish to 
examine the nature of current American strategic thought regar~ 
ding the fu.rtherance of this deterrence and compliment the dis-
cussion with a relatively brieft rundo~m of our hardware capabilitie~ 
which are designed to enable us to implement the doctrine. The 
latter information will serve as a basis for the last chapters 
analysis of fu.ture alternatives. 
Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld sets forth the four 
basic objectives of the strategic nuclear forces in the annual 
Defense Department Report for Fiscal Year 1977. They are as 
follows: l 
-- To have a well-protected, second-strike force to deter 
attacks on our cities and people, at all times ; 
-- To provide a capability for more controlled and measured· -
responses, to deter less than all-out attacks; 
-- To ensure essential equivalence 1,vi th the USSR, poth now 
and in the future, so that there can be no misunderstandings 
or lack of appre=ciation of the strategic nuclear balance; 
--To maintain stability in the strategic nuclear competition, 
forsaking the option of a disarming first-strike capability 
and seeking to achieve equitable arms control agreements 
where possible . 
RUtllsfeld states that the present force structure is adequate and 
that : 2 
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(e)ven after a well-coordinated surprise attack, the U. S. 
could retaliate with enough power to destroy its enemy as a 
modern, functioning society , 
but he warns that the balance is rapidly shifting away from our 
fav-or to the point where we "soon" may not enj oy this capability. 
In painting a pi_cture that reflects the predominate Pentagon 
view that our current defense posture is secure but that in light 
of massive Soviet efforts to achieve parity and possibly superiority, 
we are obligated to move -vigorously to maintain a stable balance , 
the Secretary contrasts our considerable advantage over the Rus~ 
sians in some areas with a few serious deficiencies in others . 
Of primary importance is the knowledge that ,-/'/e area number of 
years ahead in nuclear weapons technology but that existing wea-
pons systems are lacking in spare parts , are months behind schedul e 
for being overhauled, and in some cases , are entirely obsolete~ 
The apparant brittleness of our forces is borne out by the fact 
that stocks depleted by the 1973 Mideast airlift will not be 
replaced unti 1981~ 
The four basic obj ect-i ves of our strategic nuclear force s -
as expounded by Rumsfeld point to the two predominate doctrine s 
which provide- the backbone for all military thought ragarding 
deterrence , the Nixon Doctrine, which Gerald Ford has left un-
changed , and the Schlesinger Doctrine which continues despite 
the departure of i ts namesake and intense scrutiny from the Con-
gress. 
The Nixon Doctrine propounds neither parity nor superiority 
but rather, sufficiency . As interpretec}by Jerome Kahan, it entails 
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six main objectives : 5 
--maintain an effective strategic retaliatory capability to 
deter a surprise attack by any nation against the U.S.; 
--preserve stability by reducing the vu~nerability of U.S. 
strategic forces and thereby mini~ize Soviet incentive to 
strike first; 
--prevent the Soviets from being able to inflict considerably 
more damage to America' s popu~ation and industr;r than we · 
could inflict on them; 
--defend the United States against small-scale attacks and 
accidental launches; 
--develop flexible options permitting U.S. forces to be used 
in controlled and limited ways; 
--insure overall numerical balance doesn ' t become disadvan-
tageous to us. 
Perhaps the most important implication of all this is the apparant 
rejection of the launch-on-warning. p·blicy, which as T mentioned 
earlier, is highly destabilizing~ 
The Schlesinger Doctrine, announced in the Winter· of 1974, 
is designed to strengthen deterrence by increasing. the credibility 
of the ties between our opposition of any Soviet military initia-
tives and our deployment of nuclear weapons. Former Secretary 
of Defense James Schlesinger, acting out of a belief that our 
military posture left us in a position of either having to respo~~ 
to the Russians with a full-scale attack or with nothing at all , 
argued for flexibility that entailed retargeting some of our 
Minuteman ICBMs away from population centers and missile silos .. 
This flexibility, which essentially requires no new hardware! · 
will enable the United States to make limited counter-fbrce strike s 
against the Soviets in the event that they try to overrun Europe . 
While our assured-destruction forces were held back to prevent 
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the Russians from attacking our cities~ the s e limited strikes , 
it is claimed, would reaffirm our commitment to the Europeans as 
well as prevent the war from escalating to uncontrollabl e levels~ 
In order for nuclear bombs and missiles to affect a de-escalation, 
we would have to deploy them in such a way so as to assure the 
Russians that our actions were limited and designed to end hos-
tilitie s , not achieve a victory.. However, these strikes would 
have to disrupt enemy forces and introduce a pause in military 
activitie s during vvhich time all possible diplomatic initiatives 
could b e exploited~O 
lilr. Schlesinger and his supporters from hoth inside and out ... 
side government have noted that because the current credibility 
of a full-scale retaliatory strike on Soviet cities is very low, 
the new doctrine of limited ref?ponse improves deterrence and leaves 
open the possibility of U.S . first use 'anywhere in the world~l 
Yet t:ne critics remain staunchly unconvinced and they voci,ferously 
assert that not only have we had flexible targeting for many 
years~2 but that serious problems have been associated with this 
option all along. According to a recent study of the effect'a 
U.S. limited counter-force strike might have on Soviet plans to 
grap Europe: 13 
••• a higher probability of a limited negative payoff may be 
more than overbalanced by the small probability of a very 
advantageous positive payoff, leaving a potential aggressor 
with a net positive expectation. . 
If , for example , the U.S.S.R. was. not made to seethe evil of its 
'Nays after the first American limited counter-force strike ' against 
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targ.ets such as dams,and railway networks and they continued their 
offensive, we would still have our backs to the wall. It would 
be foolish to think that onc e the Soviet Union had taken the 
monumental political gamble of attacking Europe that she would be 
deterred by the imposition of some limited internal damage. Rather 
than stopping, the Russians would be more likely to press on and 
perhaps demonstrate their ovm resolve through a series of limited 
attacks on the United States. Even if they , opted to direct all 
their military efforts at conquering Europe and did not conduct 
reprisal raids, America would be in a position of having to again 
inflict limited damage on the Soviets, with an increased degree 
of uncertainty as to the " coercive power of such-a move, or, it 
could increase the scope of the attack and risk escalation that 
could bring on great destruction to the cities and industry of 
both sides. The decision would no doubt take s.ome time and while 
we debateJ, the Russi~s could " continue their advance, " gra9 si~ 
zable chunks of Europe, and then declare a cease-fire. 
At this point in the scenario, the United States must accept 
the fait , accompli because any further attacks Yvhose purpose is t 'c)" 
force the Soviets to withdraw will surely invite costs to our 
homeland that override any possible gains in keeping Europe al-
ligned with the West. 
In seeking the correct strategy , if indeed one exists", i t 
sholud be reali~edthat in no practical ·manner can the American 
strategic nuclear forces be linked with t he defense of Europe. 
The belief that this link may exist , and that a Soviet assault 
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on our troops will trigger massive retaliation, is most certainly 
on the forefront of their minds and for that reason, no great change. 
in the Europe~~ status quo can be ~~ticipated. But if deterrence 
fails, we will have to rely on our theatre nuclear and conventional 
forces . 
A primary failing of the Schlesinger Doctrine is that it 
forgets the great importance of resolve in conflict resolution. 
The Soviet decision to take Europe vtill obviously reflect massive 
doses of determination on their part, to which a U.S. show of 
force vis a vis a limited attack will simply not be equal. And 
a mustering of sufficient. resolve ort our part, requiring us to 
wrought. a sizable amount of destruction on the enemy, will · be too 
likely to prove escalatory. We can not and should not be willing 
to lose New York to save Paris. 
It has been argued by Schlesinger that limited nuclear strike s 
would be necessary to 'effectively counteract a Russian show of 
resolve in a scenario that had them making some limited counter-
force attacks on us while simu~taneously marching on Europe~4 In 
my view, a~y coercive tactics by the Soviets designed to mil1imi ze 
our involvement in the tactical defense of our NATO allies by 
striking the United States could not possibly bbe seriously con-
sidered by the Kremlin. The Communists will not dare. to sweep 
across the European continent unless they detect a drastic di-
minishing of our resolve to the point thaf 'tve would b e more inter-
ested in preserving ourselves than risking a strategic nuclear 
exchange that might turn the flow of battle in our favor. In 
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other words, the Soviets, before attacking, will presumably an-
ticipate that we shall acc.~pt a defeat of our tactical forces. 
Thus, a Soviet strategic attack, however limited, would, for them . , 
dangerously expand the theatre of war and possibly invite a strength-
ening of American resolve, clearly a counter-productive move. 
Finally, the Schles inger Doctrine fails to confront one of 
the m.ajor dilemmas that has plagued those who have sought to 
justify the use of nuclear weapons. Because of the tremendous 
destructive power of even the smallest kiloton atomic devices, 
with their untold traumatic side effects, no one is in a position 
to define what constitutes Jl limited". Mr . Schlesinger himself 
has said that the limited.attacks he .envisions would res1il:t in 
between fifteen and twenty';'five thousand casualties;5 figures 
which very conceivably could place us in a hostile and war-like 
posture as s een through the eyes of the Kremlin and nec essitating 
a vicious retaliation. Besides, it is no mean feat to convince 
the enemy in wartime that the missiles raining dQ1;VTI on him are 
designed to end the fighting. 
If anything , this discussion of the Schlesinger Doctrine has' 
highlighted the many uncertainties that'go hand in hand with the 
posession of nuclear weapons by the United States and the Soviet 
Union and make it virtually assured that security iii Europe will. 
not be endangered. I will expound on thi s more fully in subse-
quent chapters. 
For nov'! though, I ' would like to turn to a survey of the 
current military posture of the United St ates and examine the 
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hardware in our arsenal that gives substance to our strategy. 
Our offensive forces are basically divided into ~hree separate 
weapons ' systems, the Triad, consisting of bombers, fixed ICBMs , 
and submrine-launched ballistic missiles . As currently deployed , 
the Triad mutually reinforces itself and insures that in the 
event of two of the components ·.:being destroyed, the third will 
still be able to inflict unacceptable damage on the U.S.S.R. 
The strategic bomber force is the oldest of the three weapons 
systems that make up the Triad , yet it is the most expensive to 
. t . 16 maJ.n aln. The aircraft which provides the backbone of this 
component is the Boeing B-52, a plane which can carry between 
four and six hydrogen bombs of up to 24 megatons as well as 2 
megaton-range missiles~ 7 On most missions, oldy one megaton bombs 
will he used so · that six short range attack missiles (SR.MI) with 
nuclear capability can be added to :, Bl,lppreSs air defenses~8 Thirty 
percent of the b-52s are kept on continual grqund alert which 
will enable them to take off and escape from the immediate areas 
of thej:r bases upon warning of Soviet missile . launchings~9 and 
recently , the Strategic Air COIIunand has been deploying them at 
inland airfields to avoid the possible threat of depressed.,..tra-
jectory SLBms~O 
Current plans call for strike aircraft to penetrate Soviet 
airspace at very low altitudes to avoid radar detection; attack 
either preprogram..rned positions or ,targets of opportunity, ' and then 
t d d th . . ' t' 21 continue on to friendly bases loca e aroun ·e enemles perlme er. 
Whether the B-52 will be able to accomplish its Llissio-ns against 
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the thick Russian air defenses can not be known for sure hOv'lever 
most sources estimate that roughly fifty percent of the attacking 
force · will get through~2 Sixty percent of our initial inventory 
is 1ikly to be destroyed in a Soviet first strike~3 but the chances 
of penetration by the remaining aircraft are not expected to be 
greatly diminished because the latest enemy interceptors such . 
as the Mig-25 Foxbat still lack sufficient technology to shoot 
down low-flying p1anes~4 
In addition to the B-52s, the U.S. maintains almost 600 air-
craft in Europe, both land and sea-based, that are capable of 
hitting Western Russia and the Ukraine with bombs of up to one 
megaton in yield~5 
Despite the fact that these planes will be useful well into 
the 1980s and capable of destroying hard targets if equipped with 
laser or television guided bombs, the U.S. has been developing a 
new generation intercontinental bomber called the B--l ~6 This 
plane, which former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger called 
the most cost-effective force prograrnIfor the 1980s~7 will carry 
almost. twice as much payload as its predecessor28 and carry a 
pricetag far in excess. of 20 billion dollars if the Air Force 
gets the 244 it wants~9 The B-1 will offset any Soviet air defense 
improvements but :r:ecently discovered design deficiencies reducing 
the bombers speed from a planned Mach 2.2 to Mach 1.6 have serious 
implications for its ability to escape its home bases significantly 
faster than the B-52~0 - Congress has given firm support for the 
program and a production decision is expected later this year~l 
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The importance of the manned bomber as a retaliatory weapon 
has been greatly diminished by the intercontinental ballistic 
missiles introduced during the 1960s. Deployed in both fixed land 
posi tions and submarine,s, these warheads have been viewed as having 
a far better chance of penetrating Soviet defenses .and it is only 
within the last few years that the fixed missiles vulnerability 
to pre-emptive attack has raised serious questions about their 
efficacy. It can be said that despite any doubts current planners 
have about the land-based silo ICBM, these weapons will continue 
to serve an essential function in the Triad· for the greater part 
of the next decade. 
The United States now has 1054 leEr-lIs; 54 Titan lIs with 
single 5-10 megaton warheads, 450 Minuteman lIs with 1-:2 megaton 
warheads , and 55.0 Minuteman Ills that carry three 170 kiloton 
warheads , each in its own independantly-targetable re~entry ve-
hicle (MIRV)2 2 Of the three, the latter is the most modern and 
the most important and therefore is worthy of description in some 
detail • . 
The Minuteman III, which is still in production':3 costs 4. 5 . 
million dollars without its warhead but it remains the cheapest 
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part of the Triad to operate • . It has a circu~ar error probability 
(CEP)35 of 1300 feet which gives it a single-shot kill capability 
of only 44% against a silo reinforced to withstand 300 psi over-
pressure36 however the MK l2A re-entry vehicle how being pl~ced 
on Minuteman III will significantly enhance performance. Incor-
porating the world's most advanced fuses and guidance systems , 
the PlIk 12A with a standard payload of three WIIRVed 340 kiloton 
warheads will have a CEP of less than 700 feet which should give 
it the consistent ability to destroy hardened targets?7 
Al though the I~linuteman III has been in service for over 
five years, superior American tecbnology, which is significantly 
ahead of Russian efforts in such areas as missile guidance, blast 
effect, and re-entry vehicle s , has enable our ICBMs to stay in 
the same league with the latest Russian developments?8 For 
example, the new Soviet ICBWIs introduced during the last two 
years do not carry decoys, equipment we deployed in the mid-
Sixties~9 In addition, the Command Data Buffer System that will 
be completed by 1977 will allow us to remotely retarget a .Minute-
man to anyone of at 1.east 8 different targets in 36 minutes ' and 
allow the reprogramming of the entire force in under ten ho~_r-s~O 
Finally, the United States is now sending'up a series of navi-,. 
gational satellites that presumably will be used for mid-course 
missile guidance that could give us accuracy Which can not be 
equalled for years to come by the Soviets~l 
Our Minuteman are deployed in 6 large areas 250 feet under--
ground42 in silos that can withstand 1000 psi and shiled against 
EMP~3 However, it has been acknowledged by most scholars that 
American .ICBMs will definitely become Vulnerable to a Soviet · 
first strike if they allocate enough mi s siles to the task and 
improve accuracy and MIEV technology~4 
Former Secretary of Defense: Clark Clifford stated in 1969 
that if one anticipated the highest projec.ted Soviet threat and 
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the worst defensive circumstances , a U. S. second strike would 
still destroy more than 40% of the Russian population and 75% 
of the industry~5 Yet it stands to reason that as our ICBMs 
become more and more vulnerable, the military will become all 
the more nervous about its retaliatory abilities. In the thirty 
minutes warning time that we will have after a Soviet missile 
launch;6 the Joint Chiefs of Staff, unconvinced that a sufficient 
number of Minutemans could ride out the attack, could convince an 
President 
unsure/to fire our missiles , thus sending the nation to an uncer-
tain fate. 
As less that 25% of our deterrent resides in fixed ICBMs;7 
the United States may de.cide · to scrap these missiles altogether 
or perhaps go to a sys~em of land-mobility. 
The final third of the U.S. strategic Triad is the fleet of 
41 Polaris and Poseidon missile-firing nuclear submarines, each 
carrying sixteen SLBIVIs. The older Polaris boats , first tested in 
1960 , have subsequently been l'IIIRVed so that each tube contains 
three , 200 kiloton warheads, while the ne~Ner Poseidon has 10 re-
entry vehicles per missile yielding fifty kilotons a:piece~8 With 
a CEP of not much less than t mile;9 our current.SLBMs are in-
capable of destroying large numbers of Soviet ICBMs and t herefore 
they do not pose a serious first-strike threat~O 
Roughly two-thirds of our SSBNs are on patrol at any one time~l 
which means that this segment of the Triad alone is capable ,of 
killing thirty percent of the Soviet population and knocking out 
, · 52 . nl 75'10 of it ' s industry in a countervalue attack, assu.Tlllng a y 
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routine attrition due to equipment failure. Whether the Russians 
could detect and destroy any of our sea-based missile deterrent 
and thereby affect some damage-limitation is a matter of conjec-
ture.. Like all other calculations about the losses to be incurred 
during a nuclear war, we really have no idea as to how vulnerable 
our subs are to Soviet ASW (anti-submrine warfare);3 however the 
U. S. Navy has claimed that none of its Polaris boat.s have ever 
been tracked, or even detected while on station~4 
iVhile it may very well be that both the American and Russian 
missile submarines are , for all intents and purposes, invulnerable 
from an enemy first-strike;5 the commlinicati,ons systems that link 
them to land-ba;sed decision makers are not and herein lies the 
catch to what would otherwise be the safest and therefore the most 
stable deterrent force. Because of waters inability to sustain 
radio transmissions, submarines must position t ·hemselves at 
relatively shallow depths in order to receive . com:rnands~6 This 
makes the force more susceptible to improved Soviet ASit/ and 
furthermore, these signals are transmitted by massive electronics 
networks which can not be hardened and which can be destroyed in' 
a number of different ways . A modified EC-IJO called Tacama is 
now being put into service over the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans 
which will serve as a backup command and control relay station 
however it does not have the capacity to handle the large amounts , 
of detailed targeting information which may be requir~d~7 
At present, United States SSBNs are generally superior to 
their Russian counterparts. They are much' quieter and are more 
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quickly overhauled~8 but it has' been decided to develop an en-
tirely new underwater deterrent system so that we will have the 
option of reducing the more vulnerable land-based forces. Costing 
more that 30 billion dollars for a..'I1, initial batch of ten, the new 
system, called Trident , will consist of newly designed SLBThTs as 
well as the submarines themselves~9 The Trident. SSBN, which 
could be incorporated into the Navy sometime in 1979~0 will be 
almost as long as two football fields, have a weight of 18,700 ' 
tons, and carry 24 missile tubes~l When initially deployed, these 
tubes will carry Trident I SLBfils with a range of 4,000 nautic,al 
miles and a CEP of less than 1500 feet;62 these missiles villI 
also bebackfitted in ten of the thirty-one Poweidon boats~3 
Sometime during the 19,80s , the Trident II SLBM, which will take 
full advantage of the Trident sub's enlarged missile tubes , will 
enter service carrying 14, 150 kiloton vlarheads that could be 
launched from U.S. territorial ~aters~4 
Obviously, the United Stat~s has other offensive systems 
besides the Triad that figure prominantly in the nuclear balance 
with the U.S.S.R. however before discussing these, I would lik;e 
to take a quick look at our primary defensive systems. 
The SALT I Treaty of 1972 put stri~t limits on active missile 
defense systems . Under the provisions of that bilateral pact, 
we spent 4 billion dollars on a single site at Grand Forks, North 
~akota to protect against a Chinese attack and limited Soviet 
strikes~5 The Safeguard anti-mi~sile system became operational 
66 late last year, however, at the time of this writing, it appears 
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that the entire project, with the exception of the sophisticated 
radar, will be phased out, leaving our Minuteman deterrent force 
protected only by their super-hardened silos~7 
Through another series of de-activations of obsolete ordinance , 
the United States now has zero surface-to-air missiles (SAbi~)~8 
and the modest Soviet bomber threat will instead be countered 
by several hundred interceptors whose primaI""lJ purpose is peace-
time patrol of American airspace . This weakened anti~aircraft 
posture has been recognized by both the Army and Congress which 
has recently voted funds for lar~scale deployment of the S.A..lVI-D, 
an advanced missile that is now proceeding at . an exceptional pace 
through its testing schedule~9 When in service, · the SAlVI-D wili 
defend against any cur;rent or projected Russian bomber .threat, 
even when attacks are made at extremely lovv al ti tudes over irreg-
ular terrain!O 
Our ASW capabilities have never been hampered and thus it 
is accepted by most observers that we are far s.uperior to the 
Soviets in this regard: l having better technology as well as far 
h 1 " t " ft ~ f" t . d to the J"ob7• 2 moree lCOP ers, alrcra ,ana · rlga es asslgne 
The U.S . Navy expects to continually track Russian SSBNs and 
destroy them immediately at the outset of awar7 3 however, accor-
ding. to the respected Stockholm International Peace Research 
Insti tute , we could localize most ·enemy subs but only under 
" extremely favorable" conditions!4 
The above weapons systems, ABM, SMJis , and ASW, all constitute 
active defenses. More often than not, however~ they are brought 
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into play by so-called passive defenses , such as radar and other 
early warning devices. Mosi;6otable among our strategic early 
warning systems are the three satellites which orbit in such a 
way so as to be able to remain above a fixed point on the earth . 
By continually monitering Soviet launching sites, we will know 
immediately when an attack has been inaugerated75 Defenses 
against surprise' SLBM firings are still thin but newly developed 
phase d a rray radars should fill in all the gaps before 198076 
At the present time, the United States is engaged in a num-
ber of projects that will provide early warning against manned 
attacks and cruise missiles , should the Soviets develop them,. 
Three massive radar Sites, each looking in a di,fferent ,direction, 
are rtow being built that will give us the ability to look ove~ 
the horizon by bouncing signals off the upper atmosphere7? The 
drawback of this system is that it is not as accurate or discrim-
inatory as conventional radar and in northern, areas , it will be 
subject to ionospheric disturbartces78 Ballistic missile early 
warning systems are similarly limited and they can not predict 
impact points to better than 200 square miles79 
It is likely that the Airborne Warning and Control System 
(AWACS), now being given deployment funding by Congress, will 
serve as the most reliable and invulnerable early warning complex. 
Essentially an electronics-stuffed Boeing 707 or 747, AWACS will 
be ' able to detect aircraft flying a few feet above the ground and 
double as a mobile command center if ground facilities are des-
80 troyed. 
( 45 ) 
Thi s study of the offensive and defensive forces that would 
be employed by the United States in the event of a war with the 
Soviet Union has revealed that we are militarily strong and that 
in some key areas, we are ahead of our opponents. The arsenat 
contains sonie 100, 000 nuclear weapons8l and ¥le are bUilding three 
82 more every day. We have a virtual monopoly of forward based 
8-' 
systems.~ The Triad has given us diversity that complicates 
defenses and counterforce strikes and guards against technical 
breakthroughs~4 And vve maintain a II considerable superiori ty" in 
counterforce capabilities that will c-ontinue even if no new pro-
grams are initiated~5 
That we are militarily strong can not be denied but scores 
of analy=ists embroile,d in the current fierce debate concerning 
United States defense posture claim that we can- not be satisfied 
with the state of essential equivalence vis a vis the U. S. S.R . 
If one studies the overall strategic balance desregarding, the 
many areas where one side of the other is ahead, -one sees that 
the Communists have caught up to;" the United States and are moving 
at a pace which make s them appear to be -gaining a limited degree 
of superiority . In a viorld where the perception is the reality , 
superiority for either side , though strategically meaningless , 
could have serious implications. 
It has been suggested that the United States has grown blase 
to the idea of strategic superiority because we were unable to 
use it vrhen we had i t~6 Plus , ther.e is a widely accepted belief 
that a Soviet advantage in the arms race will encourage them to 
(46 ) 
engage in limited aggr,es s ion or support wars of national liber-
ation;87 and some extremists warn that even more rash actions 
could be expected . 
On the other hand, academicians have been arguing that we 
must extricate ourselves from the numbers game and realize that 
as long as we are able to inflict unacceptable damage on the 
Soviet Union , deterrence will prevail . 
Current feelings among U.S. decision-makers tend toward the 
belief that deterrence is not a substitute for defense , and "a 
great deal of alarm has been expressed about the trend" which saw 
defense spending drop 29% from 1968 to 1974, measured inconstant 
1974 dollars~8 A recent Congressional "resolut;i.on, the Jackson 
Amendment , has mandat~d that the United States remain equal in 
overall potential military effectiveness with the Soviet Unio~89 ' 
and the latest defense budget provided most or all of the funds 
reque$tec.· by the Armed Forces for major project s such as the 
B-1 , Trident, and AWACS~O 
{47 } 
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SOVIET :rnJCLE1\R CAPABILITIES ANTI PERCEPTIONS 
Very bluntly, we have no provable theories on what makes 
the Union of Soviet Socialist RepubJ.ics tick~ While some experts 
have deduced the overall priorities of Russian policy formulation, 
Gallagher and Spielmann in their Soviet Decision-Making ,for TI~­
fense, advise us in the West that our analytic attempts are 
doomed to failure . They write: 2 
Soviet policy should be interpreted as the product of men 
whose actions are affected not only by the routines of 
bureaucratic organization, the play of institutional interests t 
the constraints of technology, and the logic of strategy, 
,but a£so , 'end at least equally importantly, by the pecuJ,iar 
demands imposed on them by the unique political ehviroriment 
in which they operate.. There is, thus, a large and irre-
ducible area of human choice involved in the process by which 
the Soviet Union ·selects weapons systems and force posture s 
that i$-hot susceptible to the predictive tools of Western 
analysis. 
There is a fairly broad consensus that Marxist-Leninist ideolog-,r . 
has ' playc-d a large role in Soviet thinking about the use of nu-
clear weapons and a brief study of these beliefs is essential 
to placing Russian global intentions in perspective .. 
The widely held view that the Soviet Union wishes t o fore-
cibly take over the world ~sing all the means at it ' s disposal 
simply does not square with the teachings of Lenin.. Russian 
author A.S. Milovidov has recently published a book in which he 
states that: 3 
Experience has convincingly confirmed the correctness of 
Lenin's thesis that (quoting Lenin) 'peace ••• will advance 
the cause to an infini tely gre~ter ex~ent than v/ar • •• • 
While it is made very clear that the Soviet Union i S , intent upon 
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spreading socialism to every nation on eartht Milovidov also 
establishes that4 
••• Communists consider defense of socialist conquests and 
the prevention of a nuclear war to be the most vital task 
of the present day. 
It can not be emphasized enough that Russia seeks to avoid a 
general nuclear holocost as much as we do? However, as Leninists , 
they believe that Communism exists in a hostile world and that 
wars will disappear only after the total destruction of rival 
6 systems. Therefore, the U.S.S.R. remains a lot less confident 
that deterrence can be maintained, the reason for their trying 
to develop war-winning capabilities. 
According to Marxist-Leninist doctrine , in a great war, the 
Soviet Union will emer.ge victorious, which is defined as self-
survival and the destruction of capitalism. In such a conflict , 
which is not taken to be inevitable; it is expected that the pro~ 
letariat will revolt .around the world and j oin forces -against the 
" imperialists"~ The Russians assume in all their literature 
that the final struggle, a general nuclear war, will be started 
by the West, and indeed they are prevented themselves from in aug-
erating hostilities by the Leninist ideology which preaches that 
wars can be - in;itiated only if one is sure of winning and, gains 
outweigh the costs? 
At present , Lenin is exhaustively quoted in almost every 
Soviet military publication, however the precise nature of his 
influence can not be ascertained, norc-an we judge the importance 
socialist doctrine will have in the future. We are equally unsure 
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as to which direction Communist Party ideology will push Soviet 
military objective~. Paul Nitze va-ote in Foreign Affairs that if 
the Russians gained a strategic advantage, their ideology would 
have them exploit it~O however Philip Mosely told Henry J~ckson's 
GoverYl...rnent Operations Subcommit t ee that a superior position would 
make them more cautious . In :Mosely ' s words: ll 
From the Soviet point of view, the danger of war increases 
as communism increases its strength and expands the areas 
it rules. In other words, the greatest danger of war, in 
view of Soviet ideology, arises as their power expands and 
as their capacity to exert power ihcre.ases. . So, from their 
point of view, the growth of their power, the fact that no 
one 'vvould attack them today, that they have a secure deterrent 
of their o'vm and could de'stroy any other country in the world 
today, this does not give them the sense of relaxing~ It 
makes them feel the next stage is the most dangerous one 
and that they must have the maximum power organized and 
ready tcy6,se at that time. . '. 
This caution and the high state of preparedness that accom-
panies it are reflected in the Soviet view of its strategic nu-
clear relationship with the United States. Gallagher and Spiel-
. 
man.">J. claim that professional Russian analyists no\ .... fully under-
12 stand our military doctrines, and it is known that large numbers 
of American nuclear treatises, including Taylor ' s Uncertain Trum.-
~ and Kissinger's Nuclear Weapons and Foreigg 1'olicy have 
achieved wi.de distribution among the ruling circles in translated , 
mildly altered editions~3 Yet the U.S.S.R. ' s massive military 
buildup of the past decade is assumed to have been formulated 
" ." 14 
with no precise formula for Soviet-American relations and the 
former still refuses t o believe in our good will, contending that 
15 we would destroy them if given the chance. 
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Before looking at Soviet nuclear strategy, I wish to shed 
a few insights into their thinking on an actual atomic war-hoy'! 
it will come about and what form it will take. 
The Russians believe that a nuclear conflict would begin with 
a surprise attack of evolve out of a": limi ted one~6 Once started, 
such a war would be an all-out fight to the finish involving mass 
armies deployed throughout the world prepared to engage in pro-
tracted hostilities that bore no re1tion to conventional battles 
of the past~7 If follows' that the Soviets place a premium on 
getting off the first strike because they feel that the Side 
which takes the initiative, especially in a surprise attack , could 
very well insure that the outcome of the war is favorable;8 even 
. t . 19 agalns a super~or enemy. 
If the U.S.S.R. does exercise its penchant for taking the 
initiative and resorts to the use of strategio nuclear weapons ,' 
ei ther after U. S. first use in Europe or in the heat of a crisis. 
in which an American launch seems imminent, she:will seek to 
simultaneously destroy military targets and our economic base~O 
In the event that the United States commences strategic strikes , 
most indications point to a Soviet launch-on-warning with the 
similar objective of wiping out enemy forces-in-beingas well as 
eliminating: all military and industrial poteiitial~l 
While the idea of the Soviet Union believing it can fight 
and win a general nuclear war seems preposterous to American 
forms of coITh.llon sense, we must remember that the Communists are 
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much less afraid of thinking about the unthinkable and that , as 
John Erickson has poonted out in a study for the Royal United 
Ser-viices Institute for Defence Studies, there is a body of evidence 
which shows that a first strike has been considered~2 The full 
implications of this will be examined in a later chapter however 
it may be that such an extreme stance by .the Russians regarding 
nuclear warfare is a strong reinforcement to deterrence. Fur-
therrnore , the Soviet doctrine of being able to fight an atomic 
battl e to the finish once deterrence has failed should give 
pause to supporters of the Schlesinger Doctrine and others who 
trust that the Russians, with their largean,d inaccura,te 'warheads, 
will adhere to damage..,..limitation and"no-c.ity or no-escalation 
policies~3 
IvIichael MccGwire has succinctly summarized Soviet nuclear 
strategy as follows: 24 .. 
---a high value is placed on reducing the amount of damage 
inflicted on the So.viet Union, in protecting the center of 
government anc}1.n preserving the population. 
---Western Europe assumes a cruci<li importance as an alter-
native economic base on which to rebuild society. 
---a high value is placed on destroying the West's war-
fighting potential as well as her existing forces. 
These national objectives generate the fqllowing military require-
mertts: 
---destroy Western strategic nuclea r delivery systems at the 
outbreak of war in order to reduce the amount of damage 
inflicted on Russia and to deny the West the option of 
holding back strategic missiles, which could be used to 
influence the subsequent course of the war and to destroy 
Europe as an economic base . 
( 56 ) 
---provide $ufficient active and passive protection to the 
locus of central government to ensure its ability to function 
at an acceptable level. To provide more widespread passive 
protection so as to ensure the survival of an adeQuate -pro-
portion of the population, and a skelatal frameword of na-
tional government. 
~--develop a concept of operations for the seizure of Europe 
at the outbreak of war, which 'will spare Europe's industrial 
and agricul tural capacity to the greatest practicable extent .. , 
---destroy the Viest's war-making capacity, both the forces 
in being and its war potential. 
For the remainder of this chapter, I will dwell on the effect 
of these Russian beliefs and objectives on a stable nuclear balance 
between the superpowers , then move on to adapt these to a Soviet 
perspective on detente, and finally touch upon their military 
hardware and the great stockpiling of the last decade. 
Implicit' :in Mc cGwire ' s ,outline is a rejection 'Qy the U.S.S . R. 
of the American policy ' of mutual assured destruction (MAD ) , a . 
policy which insures that any major strategic exchange between 
the superpowers will . re.suJ. t in totally unaccepta-ble damage to 
both sides. - The Soviet s want to surVive a nuclear holocost and 
they assert that a peace pased on the terror of MAD can only 
perpetuate the threat of war~5 
It is obvious that the Russian emphasis on defense is regarded 
as destabilizing by the Uni ted_ States which believes that deterrenc e 
is best served through the mutual Vulnerability of both sides . 
Yet the former nation has ' refused to compromise its strategic 
doctrines or eschew certain types of weapons that we believe in-
crease the chances of nuclear war . For eXGL-nple, initial deploy-
ment s of Soviet ICBMs were all soft-sited even though thi s indi-
( 57 ) 
cat ed a first-strike intention to America~6 
Recent debates about detente have brought the question of 
the superpowers affecting each others strategic stances t o ahead . 
As has become clear, the objectives of both sides in promoting 
detente have been very different and .in the case of the United 
States, incorrect perceptions have more recehtly led to serious 
disillusioYl.lIlent that could re·sul t in increased, not decreased 
tensions. A report released by the Defense Intelligence Agency 
in the Pentagon, that strongly contributed to the firing of James 
Schlesinger, demonstrated that the Soviets view detente27 
••• as a strateg",{ for achieving broader U. S. S. R. strategic 
objectives and tactical aims without causing sufficient 
concern to galvanize serious counteraction by the West ••• 
The main points of the, study were as follows: 
---Soviet •• • objectives • • • include the breakup of Western 
alliances ; eviction of the American military presence from 
Europe and achievement of Soviet military dominance there. 
---detente has become possible, the Soviets believe, because 
the West has been forced to recognize thEi:hanging correlation 
of forces and is therefore accomodating to ris.ing Soviet 
power .. 
---A major tenet of Soviet detente policy is to avoid stra-
tegic nuclear war. At the same time, they seek to neutralize 
those areas of power competition where superior U~S. tech-
nology puts the U.S.S.R. at a disadvantage . 
---the U.S.S.R. expects the West to act with prudence in any 
crisis that could lead to a superpower confrontation, while 
the Soviets are prepared to exploit cris~s in pu~suit of 
their objectives to the limits of U.S . reaction, if necessary, 
by threatening military intervention. 
---Soviet detente policy. can change ••• Moscow 'v',rill compromise 
on detente of discard the policy ~~d adopt an alternative 
course ( if these options appear sufficiently attractive }. 
(58) 
Detente, therefore, does not constitute a fundamental change 
in Soviet policy as some Americans had claimed, but merely repre-
sents a bolstering of peaceful co-exist~~ce which means no hot 
wars~8 Marchall Shulman clearly warned Congress in 1975 that: 29 
(t)here should be no misunderstanding that the Soviet poli-
tical strate~J of peaceful co-existance does not imply that 
the Soviet Union renounces its ultimate commitment to the 
further advancement of communism, or that the Soviet Union 
will not take advantage of opportunities that present them-
selves for an increase of Soviet influence, it does, however, 
signify a lower tension policy and a reli~~ce upon longer 
term developments to validate Soviet aspirations. 
Additionally, we should not expect that the spirit of detenwvdll 
mean any lessoning of the arms race. Whether coincidentally or 
otherwise, th¢nternational st"ature of the Union of Soviet So-
cialist Republics has risen with their military power beginning 
in the late nineteen-s'ixtie s and continuing at the present time~O 
The Soviets believe that size and numbers are power and their 
present military posture reflects' this~l In the last few years, 
they have spent between $30 billion and $45 billion to develop 
and deploy an advanced series of ICBMs that give them a current 
three-to-one advantage in missile throw-weight~2 The new SS-18~ 
can carry a 50 megaton warhead as compared to the Minuteman's 1 
megaton1 3 and it has been said that 100 megaton warheads are . 
available~4 In an alternate configuration, the SS-18 carries 
eight MIRVs and this combined with a CEP of one-half nautical mile35 
gives it the ability to destroy "any known fixed target" in the 
. "36 
words of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, George Brown. 
To compliment the SS-18 , the Soviet s , in 1975 1 put the SS-17 
and the six-MIRV SS-19 into service in newly designed 450 psi 
silos~7 These silos, for vvhich the United States has no equivalent , 
utilize the. cold-launch or "pop-up" t e chnique that thrusts the 
missil e above ground before its engine s ignite, thus allowing 
for greater throw-weight s and permitting silos to be reused~8 
A companion ICBM, the SS-16, which mayor may not be operational , 
is believed to be land-mobile~9 
The backbone of the Soviet Rocket Force remains the 270 SS-9s 
carrying three, 5 megaton warheads or ~ singl~ 25 megaton warhead~O 
These are deployed in .group s of 6 that are often located near 
cities , a fact which cas,ts serious doubts upon :A,merican intentions 
of limiting damage to t,he enemy population11 Furthermore, the 3S-9 
with a relatively inaccurate guidance system that gives it only 
marginal hard-target capability and an obvious potential for 
obli t 'ering nearby non-military targets , exemplifies the Sovie t s 
re j ection of damage-limitation theory. 
As of mid-1975 , the Russians had the edge on the United States 
in numbers of ICBMs with 1618, however because of extensive MIRVing, 
we had more warheads to deliver with a greater degree of accuracy~2 
Approximately 700 medium and intermediate range, ballistic missiles 
(M & IRBms) are also maintained, most aimed at Europe or China~3 
Roughly 85% of Soviet ' throw-weight resides.in fixed ICBMs~4 
which explains why the Russains are unwilling to ·plan on theIr 
missile s riding out a U.S. first strike . However, r~cent strides 
in SLBMs could change this as the sea-based forces become a povter-
(60) 
ful deterrent force in their own right . 
Until the early nineteen-seventies , the Soviets primary SLBM, 
the SS-N-6 , could only count on destroying soft targets vYi thin a 
relatively short distance of the coast because of range, yield, 
and accuracy limitations~5 Now, these older missiles have been 
given smaller unguided multiple re~entry vehicles (MRV)46 while 
impressive new submrines and and SLBMs take over the primary 
targeting assigr~ents. Being turned out at a rate exceeding 
seven per year is an advanced Delta-class boat47 .that the Defens~ 
Department says uhas become a difficult vessel to locate and 
track~ •• 1148 This SSBN is deployed with 16 missile tubes,each 
carrying an sS-N-8 which has a range of over 4,000 nautical .miles 
and thus is capable of hitting targets in the United States from 
Soviet territorial waters~9 
By 1977, the year in which theinterim SALT agreement expires, 
the RUssians will have reached the 62 boat limit and will be 
producing replacements or supplemental SSBrfs at a faster pace 
than either the. Trident, which won't put to sea until 1979, and 
then only at the rate of three·.: every two years, orUni ted States 
attack submarines~O With a current inventory of 800 launchers in 
60 nuclear subs, the Soviet fleet is adequately counterd by Amer-
ican forces however, the future balance could be unstable if the 
. latter believes its sea-basEd missiles are needed for war-fighting 
51 as well as deterrence. . 
A further Russian initiative which may be destabilizing is 
the basing of cruise missile submarines in Cuba. Such vessels, 
(61 ) 
based in the Western Hemisphere in apparant violat ion of U.S.-
Soviet understandings, carry up to 8 high-kiloton warheads and 
pose a severe threat to the massive industrial cOIIlplexes of the 
Eastern seaboa~d:2 
The sea-based nuclear forces of the U. S.S.R. are indeed for-
midable and the ambitious construction programs .of recent years 
have undoubtedly eroded the sUbstantial American lead in this 
area. However, as has been the case with other examples of vast 
Russian build-ups, increased size and numbers have not directly 
translated into increased power. It is. most obvious that despite 
num.erous Soviet advancest they are still deterred-tb,ey are unable 
to capitalize on nu-rnerical gains .. Even if one imagines that 
deterrence is doomed t9 failure , as all V'lorst~caseplanners na..., 
turally do, the new generation of SLBMs will still be relatively 
ineffective against hardened land-based missile silos which means 
that surviving retaliatory forces can continue to credibly threaten 
Sovie t society . Furthermore, geogr·aphy and . superior Am.erican 
technology insures that the· Russian SSBN fleet remains partly 
susceptible . to ASW: 3 
While the Soviet SLBIVIs can admittedly cause some danger to 
the United States, their .manned bombers, for all intents and 
purposes, can not. Former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger 
made this clear in his Fiscal Year 1976 report to Congress when 
he stated that "no significant long-range bomber threat to the 
U. S. howexists": 4 Since those · words were spoken,the U. S.S.R. 
has built more than fifty Backfire supersonic aircraft;5 howev'er 
( 62) 
these planes seem to present more of a menace to arms· control 
negotiators than to the security of the United States which is 
now preparing a modernized network of air defenses. The precise 
role of the Backfire, as well as the thousand or so other bombers 
which the Russians hav~~6 will be evaluated in the chapter dealing 
with future nuclear strategy~ 
Soviet defenses also reflect the "numbers and size" mentality 
and as is the case with much of her offensive weaponry, technical 
deficiencies make fyr vulnerability against Western hardware 
which if often five to ten years ahead. 
Protection agl;linst U.S. missiles consists of the world ' s only 
ABlVI system, a 64-launcher complex protecting Moscow that, although . 
it packs multi-megaton warheads, is generally considered ineffec-
tive by Western analyists~7 In December of 1975, Aviation Week 
and Space Technology, the standard reference source on many milt:-
tary issues, reported. that the Soviets were using lasers to blind 
our warning and recQnnaissance satellites, an activity, which if 
not controlled by international agreement, could spark a minor 
revolution in strategic thinking. The Defense D~partment denied-
the report but it has become known that the Russians are interfering 
with other American surveillance techniques legitimized by the 
SALT agreements~8 Obviously, we will be preven~ed from firing 
our missiles at the Soviet Union if we have no idea where to target 
them. 
The Russian ASW effort is weak. They have no effective ca-
pabilities for open ocean ASW~9 and in fact,despite their highly 
( 63 ) 
publicized expanding worldwide naval presence , MccGwire believes 
that all Soviet ocean-going forces are far from being able to 
60 fully disccharge their war-related tasks. They have 38 nuclear 
and 160 conventional attack submarines61 however the newest V-class 
which h as a speed· advantage over all U. S. vessel s is still incapable 
of following Polaris~2 
The U.S.S.R. is defended against bomber attack by several 
thousand interceptors and 12,000 SAM ' missiles~3 these being con-
trolled from over 5000· early warning and ground control radar 
si tes~4 Yet this system, which is ·the most massive the vlOrld 
has ever se en, does not promise to achieve , a high degree of success. 
Large over-the-horizon radars are being c 'onstructed~5 new aircraft 
wi th updated electroni,cs and ordinance are being deployed~6 as 
are mobile SAMs with a minimum effective altitude of'150 , feet 
against fast aircraft~7 but this is simply not enough. The Soviet 
Union retains r~ajor wea-messes in, low-al ti tude defense bombers 
such as the B-1 which is chock full of ECM (electronic counter 
measures) that has gon~.nmatched. The technology needed to 
develop the necessary radar such as AWACS is unavailable which 
means that Russia will be equally vulnerable to cruise missiles 
68 and SRM~s. It has been suggested that when and if the United 
States eliminates manned bombers and cruise missiles, the Soviets 
will convert their ineffective SAM, sites t o more effective ABI'II 
systems in violation of the SALT treaty . Again due to techno-
logical constraints, it is very unlikely that this will occur~9 
Although absolutely n~oody of proof exists to substantiate 
(64) 
the claim, the best Soviet method of damage-limitation is prob-
ably their civil defense system. They spend $1 billion per year 
on this and at least in the public literature, they are confident 
that it will succeed in protecting enough of. the government 
structure and people to run: it against any attack!O Besides a 
vast network of public shelters, the civil defense prograIh ·gives 
special inducements to servicemen to settle in remote areas!l 
And between 1966 and 1970, the government located 60ia of new 
industry in cities or less than 100,000 people!2 Perhaps the 
civil defense system more than any otherweapon or doctrine indi-
cates the seriousness with which the Russia.11.s treat the possibility 
of a nuclear holocost • . 
The tremendous bu~up of Soviet forces, both offensive and 
defensive, has led many observers to believe that the Co~~unists 
are seeking to attain a first-strike capability. Indeed, the 
statistics are impressive; in 1974 alone, $103 billion was spent 
7~ on nuclear weapons;- and each year, over one-third of the nations 
resources are consumed by the military!4 According to Paul Nitze, 
the Soviets have bought themselves enough strength so that: 75 
(b)y 1977, after a Soviet-initiated counter-force strike 
against the U.S. to Which the U.S. responded with a counter-
force strike, the Soviet Union would have remaining forces 
sufficient to destroy Chinese and European NATO nuclear 
capability, attack U.S. population and conventional military 
targets, and still have a remaining force throw-weight in 
excess of that of the United States. 
This opl.nl.on is echoed by Defense Secretary Rumsfeld in his 1977 
Report!6 
( 65 ) 
All in all, those who claim that the U. S. S. R. is seeking to 
surpass and eventually destroy the United States forget that the 
forrn.er nation will use force only in extrem~ circumstances with 
no alternative arid with little risk!7 Each superpower V'rill con-
tinue to be deterred from attacking the other because the risks 
of destroying oneself along with ones opponent can never be ade ... 
quately deduced. Therefore , it is necessary to look elsewhere for 
the. raison d' etre of the Russian armaments program. 
Some of the reasons have alreaq,r been elaborated-to be able 
to defend the Soviet Union and defeat any opponent who attacks , 
to maintain parity with the United States with ' its superior tech-, 
nology and so forth. The Russians has hoped that increased .mili--
tary strength would give them more power in Europe;8 an effect 
which is not particularly evident. Clearly however, the U.S. 
was humbled into giving them more diplomatic maneuverability!9 
Ultimately, one must remember that the Soviets have ~o con-
ceptual limits on weapons deployment~O The proof of their be-
lieving that "more equals better" is amply demonstrated by obser-
ving that after World War II, they pla!1.Jled to build 1200 submar-
ines , and in fact were turning out 80 per year until Khrushchev 
saw the light~l 
At the 1974 SUIIunit, a top Soviet officer stated that his 
nation's ICBMs had a CEP of t mile, and not t mile as was usually 
~ . th T", t 82 assumea ln e tes • This would fulfill the "worst-case" theories 
of Pentagon stra.tegists and enable the Russians to destroy most , 
but not all , of our fixed, land-based missiles . Nonetheless , I 
. I 
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stress that beyond a shadow of a doubt, the bomber and SLBlVI thirds 
of the U.S. Triad, as well as the surviving missiles, will cons-
titute sufficient risk~ as defined by the Soviets in their stra-
tegic doctrine, to deter them from launching a first-strike, 
assuming of course that they harbor such an intention at all. 
To conclude , I reiterate what every major piece of Soviet 
military literature bluntly states: a strong nuclear posture is 
necessary to defend the homeland from hostile foes who_ wish to 
destroy her if possible~3 They believe that atomic weapons are 
central- to all phases of its militarwower84 and that because of 
the great destructive power of new conventional explosives, the 
8'-
transition to "nukes" -V'lill be fa;irly easy.::> The chance that their 
use will be called for is remote but in the hostile environment 
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TACTICAL NUCLEAR WAR AND THE SITUATION IN EUROPE 
Across a broad frontier in Central Europe, the United State s 
and the Soviet Union face each other with a vast array of military 
equipment that includes thousands of tactical nuclear weapons(TNW). 
The situation is tense, with both supowers regarding their oppo-
nents as hostile and inclined to attack . 
These circumstances , ' involving two great nations poised a t 
each others throats, but on foreign soil , are precisely those 
which could most easily foster a nuclear conflict between the 
U.S. aIld Russia. Somehow, the use of atomic weapons which are 
significantly less powerful than those contained in missile war-
heads, and which are not directly destined to annihilate ones 
own citizens, have been easier to justify. Basically, the theorists 
have reasone d that even if the nuclear threshold is crossed at 
the tactical level , escalation of hostilities · to all-out strategic 
exchanges between~·;the combatants , or the s o-called "unthinkabl e" t . 
will continue to be deterred. 
This type of thinking is dubiously optimistic , and in the 
present chapter I hope to show that not only do unkno~'m variables 
deter &'1l.erica and the U. S. S.R. from using any kind of nuclear 
device, but that no military alteration of the .E!uropean status 
quo can reasonably be expected. The disc'ussion will center first 
on the capabilities , strategies and perceptions of and in theatre 
nuclear warfare of the two sides and them move on to the likeli-
hood of a Soviet attack and the problems of constructing an ade-
(7 2 ) 
quate NAT O defense pbsture ~ 
The Soviet Uni on is fully capable of launching a massive 
battlefield nuclear offensive in Europe~ Besides the well-known 
mechanized armies , she has 3500 tactical nukes which does not 
includ e the several htmdred I'IIRBMs that are based in Russian terr-
itory~ TheseVleapons have large yields and poor accuracy and are 
mostly deployed atop small surfac~o-surface ~issiles~ 
In the event that a war breaks out between NATO and the 
'v'larsaw Pact , it is probable that the Soviet tactical nuclear 
arsenal will be utlilized. Although the Russians no longer be-
lieve in the inevitability of a European war becoming nuclear , 
they do consider. such ,escalation is highly likely1 and thus, 
in the. word s of Donald Rumsfeld; 
(t)heirTNFs (tactical nuclear forces) appear to remain an 
integral part of their warfighting capabilities. 
American analyist s have vITitten of the Soviet military pos-
ture as indicating .a strong first-strike potential against NATO 
force s , however, Communist literature asserts that if will be 
the We stern alliance which initially crosses the nuclear threshold? 
A.A. Sidorenko, in his book The Offensive, states that NATO . will 
re.ly on "massed employment of nuclear weapons"; and that rather 
than accept defeat , it will escalate· during , the most critical 
situations . In the event that we do use tactical nuke s , the 
Soviets feel that they will be forced to do likewise~ 
Regardless of rvhich side begins a war in Europ e , it can be 
(7 3 ) 
assumed that , at least for the Russians , nuclear vveapons will 
play an important role in the subsequent fighting. According 
t o Sokolovskiy's Soviet Military Strategy, the military "bible" , 
tactical nuclear weapons give better results than conventional 
means of destruction and can be used to solve problems of every 
scale~ Says Sidorenko: lO 
••• nuclear weapons will become the chief means of defeating 
the enemy • •• 
And Goure, Kohler, and Harvey add thatll 
••• Soviet military theory, doctrine, strategy, war planning, 
force structure and organization, instruction and training 
programs, battle exerCises, resource allocations, research 
and development programs and activities, civil defense efforts', 
indoctrination programs for the troops and for the populatiOn, 
war readiness measures, and so on are all keyed to and dom-
inated by the nuclear weapons factor. 
, 
Although the Soviets are probably sincere in their belief 
that NATO v'dll inaugerate nuclear attacks, it should be noted 
that they realize the importance of a first strike to their OV'ffi 
cause and would like to be able to take the initiative in crOSSing 
t , thr' h Id "f th W t b " t· 1 12 lle es 0 ~ e es ,eg~ns a conven ~ona war. ' Given the 
superior NATO mobilization resources, the Russians are well aware 
that they can not engage in protracted hostilities. In the Far 
East, where the Red Army i~imilarly incapable of waging a war 
of attrition with the Chinese, Moscow has rnaae it clear that it 
will launch a nuclear first-strike , a policy which may also apply 
to Europe~3 
The U .. S . S. R. has never said that it would restrict the use, 
t ' t "th """ f d 14 h ' of force to take the Con lnen Wl a rnlnlmlrn 0 amage, owever 
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most American strategists have assumed that preserving a solid 
economic base on which to rebuild is a top Soviet priority~5 This 
means that they wo~ld have to launch a pre-emptive attack and 'Nipe 
out all NATO forces so that we vvould have nothing to withhold for 
a deferred strike. The l ocation of every single . American tactical 
nuke is 'Nell known to both sides and therefore a successful first 
strike is a theoretical posSibility~6 
Further support for the assumption that the Soviet Union will 
not hesitate to use tactical nuclear weapons in Europe comes from 
the fact that they believe such devices raise troop morale and 
correspond:irgly lowers it for the enemy~7 Sidorenko has said that 
the side with the highest morale will win;8 something which speaks 
for the sustenance of V. S. resolve as a re.quirement for stability. 
Alain Enthoven expresses the feelings of the American govern-
ment when he states that19 
(a) free anc}1.ndependent Wester.a Europe , aligned with the . 
United States, is vital for our national security and well-
being. 
Al though our actual force levels assigned to NATO are bou...11.d to 
rise and fall with the mood of Congress , the U.S. commitment to 
safeguarding the nations of Western Europe is unlikely to diminish. 
Thus, even though American lives would have to be sacrificed to 
insure t he survival of Frenchmen or Germans , our armed presence 
aimed at deterring the Warsaw Pact must b~ .taken seriously. 
The 7000 tactical nuclear weapons stockpiled in Europe , worth 
some $2 billion~O serve three military functions-linking NATO 
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defenses to the U.S. strategic deterrent, preventing Soviet use 
of such weapons, and providing for a SOQ~d defense against a Pact 
all-out conventional attack~l As I have already mentioned, the 
first function would not work if put to the test , however its 
very nature insures enough uncertainty in Russian minds to pre-
clude their probing the link~2 The second function plays on · the 
fear that any nuclear exchange will escalate to an all-out stra-
t egic encounter, and the third represents the American belief 
that we shou~d trade off between Communist hordes and our tech-
nology~3 
Just how NATO will use tactical nuclear weapons is not clear. 
Stanley Hoffman told a Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee that 
no doctrine had even geen· developed~4 but a less pessimistic 
'oflolfgang Heisenberg, in an Adelphi Paper , has wri t 'ten that25 
•• • the present theatre nuclear forces are the product far 
more of pragmatic considerations within the military bur-
eaucracies than of an agreed" coherent strategic doctrine. 
In the short run, this indecisiveness will add considerable risk 
to any Soviet armed initiatives because the Pact will have to 
fear a NATO pushing of the panic button that could bring on a 
holocost, rather than our cooly putting thought-out· contingency 
plans into operation. However if deterrence fails, the dangers 
of a doctrinal void become obvious-lacking confidence, we might 
not use tactical nukes at all and lose the war, or, we might go 
to the opposite extreme and destroy Europe and maybe ourselves 
by using them all . 
Having no doctrine to speak of should not be confused with 
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one that is outwardly ambiguous as to how it will be implemented. 
General BrOMl of the Joint Chiefs of Staff says that 26 
NAT O will deliberately escalate to whatever extent is ne-
cessary to turn back aggressiofi. 
This conspicuous lack of particulars prevent-s the Russic=ns f rom 
evaluating the risks of an attack on Western Europe and thus is 
beneficial, however it is mandatory for NATO comrriB-nders to have 
secretly worked out prudent reactions to every possible scenario . 
Heisenberg has speculated that the United States will use 
TNW on a scale that exceeds a mere demonstration of resolve and 
that is less than a full-scale military effort. Initial attacks , 
against military targets, would hopefull delay th~nemy offensive 
and signal a willingness to escalate if necessary~7 .There is no 
doubt that the U.S., · as in the strategic arena, has a supreme ' 
interest in damage-limitation, a policy which makes s~nse for we 
have realized that, unlike Vietnam, we can not save Europe by 
destroying it~8 With this objective in mind, we have deployed 
thousands of so-called "mini-nukes" which have a blast effect 
only a fraction that of the Hiroshima bomb. In addition, NATO 
has de-activated earlier delivery systems that were either in-
accurate or of too high a yield. This policy of damage ..... limitation 
has gone so far that most American tactical nuclear bombs can no w 
be instantly adjusted by the flick of a switch to low or high 
blast power~9 
As is evident from the previous ~iscussion, both superpowers 
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are heavily armed and claiming that they will not hesitate to 
use nuclear weapons to defend their European interests . Never-
theless, if one peels away the nationalistic rhetoric which spews 
forth freely from all parties concerned, the bare set of £acts 
that i s revealed points to the conclusion that these arsenals 
will remain undisturbed. 
In setting forth the reasons for the above statement; I do 
not wish the arguments to become one-sided in the sense of there· 
being solely a "Russia as the potential aggressor" perspective . 
We must keep in mind that the Soviet Union believes the u.S. 
will be the likely initiator of hostilities, nuclear or conven- . 
tional ~O ~'1.d that, we have no right to demand the Communists 
interpret our military preparations as ruling our an attack~l 
Getting to the heart of the problem, one sees that the Soviet s 
could have only two possible reasons for attacking Western Europe . 
These are: to establish an economic and social base for t,he future 
development of socialism or the U.S . S.R. itself, and to gain some 
other advantage that would still outweigh the costs of a general 
nuclear war that might very well ensue~2 The attack would take 
one of the following forms: an all-out conventional attack, an 
all-out tactical nuclear attack, a limited conventional attack 
in pursuit of more limited objectives than establishing Soviet 
hegemony over the whol e continent, an al.I-out conventional attack 
supporte by selected u se of atomic weapons, and an all-out attack 
occuring 'simultaneously with a massive strategic offensive against 
the United State s of America . 
(18 ) 
The premise that the U.~LS. R. viill attack Western Europe to 
gain new political and economic strength does not wash in light 
of the fact (which I rvill subsequently elaborate on) that a total 
military conquest is not po s sible. And of course an attack mc-
tivated by the hop es of benefits outweighing the risks of damage 
to the Soviet homeland has already been dismissed in an earlier 
chapter as being against common sense and rJarxist theory. E~en 
in the political arena, there are constraints which prevent the 
U •. S.S.R. from waging a Y'rar in Europe. For one thing, an attack 
westward would run the risk of uniting Germany and the Soviet s 
cringe at the thought~3 They are equally afraid of agitating 
the West for fear that the Chinese, sensing a diversion, will 
attack in the East and,. possibly embroil the country in a two-
front war. Finally, it just may be that the Soviets ulti~ately 
want a neutral Europe ~~d one which is free of a u. S. military 
b t t . 1 d C . t ~ . t . 34 presence " u no necessarl y un er ormnunls a.OIDlna lon. 
In dealingvvith the military alternative s open to the Soviet s 
should they vvish to alter the European status quo , it can be seen 
that a n~mber of s ound reason can b e presented to show the infeasi-
bility of each. 
An all-out conventional war would not cause excessive damage 35 
s o a full blovm Warwaw Pact attack, sans nuclear weapons , seems 
the logical method of action. But we must · remember that they 
seek a li~htning-quick defeat of NATO forces so as to avoid a 
vvar of attrition, just as much as they seek to limit the destruc-
tio:'l. With a purely conventional Soviet attack , these two . obje c-
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iV'e s conflict because the West has it's hands on superior equip-
eI1t that \vill allow it to. defeat, or at the least, stall any 
rfensive not supporta:l by nuclear weapons. Furthermore, because 
four ambiguous policy statements, the Russians can not be absol-
'telY guaranteed that we will not resort to our tactical atomic 
·rsenal. This is also true for the French who have said that they 
~il1 use nukes in response to any Soviet attack that threatened 
36 .1er. 
In 1974, Pa1)~ Warnke told a Senate subcommittee that a limited 
lact attack to achieve limited objectives was more likely than 
amassive conventional attack~7 however the deterrence factors 
~entioned in the previous paragraph still seem to be operative 
here. I:e;the Soviets launch a surprise offensive and then Call a 
quick cease-fire before . we can respond, they involve themselves 
in a number of serious . problems that would certainly outweigh tb.e 
~ains in capturing a few key industrial centers or military outposts. 
For example, the United States might no longer be willing to 
honor its unwritten agreement to keep our of the affairs of Eas-
tern Europe. And of course, I have already mentioned the threat 
posed by China if the attentions of the Soviets are diverted. 
A third possible Russian method of attack is the unrestrained 
Use of tactical nuclear weapons in support . of massive penetrations 
by mechanized ground forces. Assuming that they had decided to 
forego any attempts at damage-limitation, this vvould be the pre-
~ 
~erred opt ion to be employed immediately aft~r a NATO-inaugerat .ed 
armed conflict, or for a surprise pre-emptive strike . 
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The problems associated with an all-out nuclear attack on 
Europe are numerous . Because the U.S. is superior in overall 
tactical nuclear capability18 virtually our entire force structure 
will have to be destroyed at the outset to prevent us from effec-
tively striking back. Given the alert status of various NATO 
defenses and a host of otheJ7factors, this can not be reasonably 
expected~9 Even if an all-out offensive attains success , Jeffrey 
Record of the Brookings Institute has stated that40 
... a pre-emptive Soviet nuclear strike of the magnitude 
necessary to deprive NATO's forward-deployed air forces of 
an effective tactical nuclear seuond-strike capacity would 
run an extremely grave risk of sparking a major nuclear 
conflict perhaps involving the · use of strategic vveapons by 
- the United States. 
Finally, if vve assume the Russians accept the risk of crossing 
the nuclear threshold , and then assume that they destroy all our 
European forces, the United States can still ca.ll up reinforcements . 
These could either be naval forces operating from the Atlantic 
and Mediterranean, tactical aircraft operating from remaining 
bases in Europe and Bri tian. , or even Strategic Air Comrn,a..Yld bombers 
flying round-trips from the United -States . 
The fourth form of attack, one which VIas primarily conven-
tional but which employed limited nuclear strikes, combines the 
drawbacks of both. Inherent in this type of attack is the · risk 
of escalation, the possibility of an extended war involving 
selected atomic strikes by both sides , and the sparing of a 
certain nl.unber of American bases and aircraft which will eventually 
be brought into play . This obviously makes no sense militarily 
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and there · is no evidence that the Russians have c.ontemplated such 
a strategy. 
The final possible scenario , involving simultaneous full-
scale attacks on the United States a...'l'J.d Europe , can be easily 
discounted in light of the reasons for the maintainence of de-
terrence which have been discussed throughout this p~.per. Con--
ceivably , if through some fantastic set of circu.rIlstances, the 
U. S. S.R. achieves the ability to destroy the vast majority of 
American strategic and tactical nuclear forces in a pre-emptive 
strike vlhile limiting damage to herself, she could implement a 
worldwide plan of this kind, however, this is currently too fan-
tastic to seriously consider. 
In the near future, the Warsaw Pact is not going to attack 
NAT O and conversely , NATO will stay away from a military engagement 
with the Warsaw Pact. , Yet a tactical nuclear war ' remains a pos-
sibility because of unforeseeable accidents and thus it is ne-
cessary for the United States to further policies of deterrence 
through a sound war-fighting capability and the veiled tl'l..reat 
linking the use of tactical nukes on behalf of Europe ' s defense 
to our strategic forces . 
In all probability the accidenta.l firing of a nuclear-tipped 
missile or the straying of aircraft over crucial enemy positions 
or .confusion-ridden border skirmishes will not l ead us dO"J'mthe 
ro.ad to Vlar. Communication links . betvveen Moscow and Washington 
will activated, cool heads will prevail , and the immediate crisis 
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will be alleviated . How~ve~ , no one really knows 'this will happen, · 
especially if the nuclear threshold is accidentally crossed , and 
therefore it will be necessary for the United States to retain a 
strong defense posture in case the Soviets somehow feel th~eatened 
enough to become aggressive . 
A complete spelling out of the hardware needed to enable us 
to adequately defend Western Europe against any kind of Pact 
attack wou~d be extremely lengthy and not entirely germaine to 
this paper. Therefore, I wish to expound only the guiding prin-
ciples which help to formulate the overall strategies and that 
eventually dictate equipment needs . 
The current debate about American involvement in NATO's 
defense of Western Europe is split down the middle between those 
who believe we have the capacity to meet a Soviet conventional 
attack using only conventional forces of our ovm1l and those who 
believe our posture is somehow deficient~2 In general, t~e former 
group presents more cogent arguments. however the pessimists have 
succeeded in bringing to light a num.ber of deficiencies in NATO 
doctrine and war-fighting capabilities that stand tobe corrected . 
There is some evidence that points to a dangerous vulnerability 
of our tactical nuclear forces to early capture and pre-emptive 
strikes73 Only one example of this is the Atomic Demolition 
IiIuni tions (ADM), nuclear devices exploded in forward areas to 
slow or che.nnel an enemies advance. ADM, to be buried in the 
ground and then detonated by remote control to form an " instant 
IiIaginot Line ", make no sense because not only will they have to 
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be used on Allied soil, their explosion will be mandatory to 
avoid their falling into Sovi-et hands~4 
Two general problems are raised by this example . First , 
realizing that vulnerability is destabilizing in a crisis because 
it invites pre-emptive attacks and thus also _puts a premium on 
premature use , we must ascertain the necessary force structure 
corrections . And secondly, we must ask the inter-related question : 
What should \ve do to keep tactical nukes under the strictest 
controls and out of situations where we are deprived of any 
options to use conventional forces? 
most military st~ategints have persuasively argued that 
NATO could best deter or defeat an attack on Western Europe . by a 
combination of strong 'conventional war-fighting strength backed 
up by invulnerable tactical nuclear forces. The United States 
is now adding planes and men to Central Europe as well as building 
hundreds -of aircraft shelters in an attempt to beef up our non-
nuclear capabilities~5 however it seems that more fundarnental 
revisions are in order • 
. vVol fgang Heisenberg has proposed some interesting restruc-
turing plans in a recent study for the Internatio:rEJ;tnstitute for 
Strategic Studies based in London~6 After disproving the oft-
held theory that Tl'rN, and not modern conventional armaments could 
offset Soviet superiority in numbers of ta~~s, manpower, and so 
on~7 he sets forth a Crisis Stability Model for the ideal European 
defense. This would involve the removal of most tactical nuclear 
weapons from the Continent once an adequate conventional posture 
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had been achieved . A few land-'based missiles would remain in 
areas removed from the front line of defense hOv'lever these wou~d 
be supported by several hundred Poseidon-launched MIRVs aime d 
at Europe~8 Alain Enthoven has supported this in his own writings , 
claiming that we have an excess of such warheads, they having 
originally been developed to overcome the Soviet ABM system~9 
Heisenberg admits that his Crisis Stability Model does involve 
slight war-~ighting limitations however he claims that this would 
not be sig-!1ificant if a strategy of escalation was followed?O 
By this he means that , we '~ will deployl TNW as a means of restoring 
deterrence; this would be in keepil1..g: with a pi.icy of 'what Ben...; 
jamin Lambeth calls51 
•• . maximizing the adversary ' s fear that , in seeking limited 
objectives at his opponents expense, he might subject him-
self to u~timate losses from massive retaliation or uncon-
'7~:- ~'=- ~.:trolled crisis escalation, either of whose consequences 
would be out of all proportion to the original values sought . 
While I have prevlou8·ly said that using nuclear weapons to restore . 
deterrence is to be avoided, Heisenberg ' s suggestions play on the 
uncertainty of a link between the defense of Europe and U. S. 
strategic nuJcesand therefore do more for deterrence than they 
do to hurt our military posture in the event of a failure by our 
conventional forees . 
To be sure , the Crisis Stability Model ha$ it t s disadvantages. 
On one hand , there is the problem of communicating vYith submarines 
i'lhich I have already discussed52 in detail else 1flhere . And on the 
other hand, the Russians v{ould have no vlay of knowing if the SLBMs 
were tactical or strategic?3 These differences however assume 
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s ome highly unlikely contingencies . A Pact. effort of the nece-
ssary intensity to disrupt submarine communications with land-
based command centers Vlould be one which could greatly enhance 
the chanc es of' escalation. As for the second drawback of the . 
Crisis Stability Model, this expects us to imagine a situation 
where both the conventional forces and the land .... based missiles 
had somehow failed, probably from a pre-emptive strike. Given 
these circumstances, the Soviets would proahably have made very 
substantial advance s in Europe and thus would be willing to declare 
a cease-fire to protect their "gains as .well as the safety of the 
U.S.S.R. itself . As for the problem . of identi.fying a missile as 
tactical or strategic, the use of depressed-trajectory SLBMs 
might alleviate any confusion. 
If we theorize even further and envision a situation where 
the use of tactical nucl ear weapons did not cause the ·Soviets to 
relent ; then it would b e apparant · that they had called our bluff 
on the link between TNW and U.S. strategic forces. In this event , 
ve would have to acc.ept our losses and give up Europe. Of course ,. 
this reasoning borders on the absurd and I bring up thi s partic~ 
ular scenario only to)press home the point that the Crisis Stability 
Model proposed by Heisenberg neither guarantee s a NATO military 
victory nor commits us to a general nuclear war . 
I now turn to the se cond . major problem facing NATO today: 
What should we do to keep tactical nukes under the strictest 
control s and out of situations where we aredeprieved of any 
options t o use conventional forces? Before beginning the dis-
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cussion, I remind the reader that my underlying assu~pt ion is 
that ~~y war in Europe will come about accidentally. 
Of the 7000 tactical nukes currently stockpiled under the 
jurisdiction of the United States for NATO use, many are artillary 
shells and small fuobile missiles destined for distribution t o 
scattered ground forces when a war breaks out . The prospect of 
these arm&-nents being sent out the the fiel~, though they could 
theoretically be needed for defense , is an extremely dangerous 
one because in conditions of heated pattIe , it is more than likely 
that low-level CTh."111Il~ders will authorize their use~4 Such a 
lowering of the nuclear threshold., which goes beyond a.Il0'"" semblence 
of Presid,ential control , speaks forcefully for a reduction of the 
number of nu.lces deployed in Europe as well as against the building 
of so-called "mini-nukes" . 
The traditional" reasons for the deployment of so m8-YlY small 
nuclear v'feapons have all been discounted. The fallacy of the 
'Communist hordes traded for Americ~""1 technology" theory has 
already ~een put aside in these pages and the other widely used 
argument that TNVo{ saves money, is also untrue. British, German, 
and U.S. studies have shown that for a variety of reasons , conven-
tional weapons are far more cost-effective and actually require 
55 the support of fe'v'ler troops. If 6000 of these tactical nukes 
are removed , a figure which has been widely used, not only will 
l;ve save $321 million per year~6 we will increase our security by 
insuring that no low-level cOImnander can order the breaking of 
the nuclear threshold if he thinks the fighting is going against 
...... ', . 
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him. 
The shoring up of our battlefield capabilities after the 
removal of the TNW can easily be accomplished through the deploy-
ment of a new generation of smart weapons , namely, laser and t el-
vision guided bombs. This hardware, because of · its accuracy, 
falls within the same price range as unguided weapons, and a 
substantial arsenal, which is currently beyond the technological 
reach of the Soviet Union, should give us a war-winning capability 
without resort to TNW. Additional developments such as a tank 
wi th armor that will withstand any knovm anti-tank gun or missile, 
due to enter service in 1980, reinforces this belief~7 
The new precision-guided munitions are so efficient, that 
if they were to be equipped with large conventional warheads, 
they could probably have the same military impact asmini~nukes . 
The~e mini-nukes, which have already be.en partially incorporated 
into the NATO forces, are sub-kiloton devices with1.ow yield and 
low radiotion effect~8 The rationale for these weapons has been 
that they will be unlikely to spark an escalation of hostilities , 
however, whether large or small tactical nukes are used, they .<. -. 
still constitute a firebreak~9 Furthermore, not only do mini-
nukes l)lur the very distinct boundary between atomic and conven-
tional ordinance, an undue reliance upon the former in our war-
•. fighting. pos·ture could easily lead us to use them prematurely 
vihen the lat t er could still suffice to turn back aggression?O 
Perhaps the best argument against a dependence on tactical 
nuclear weapons is the unsureness that we can bring ourselves 
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to'.use t hem. Given the close proximity of many military instal-
lations to large cities , up to 100 million cou~d be killed in a 
61 limited tactical nuclear war. Even a I1 successf1J~" defense of 
Europe would not be 'North such a cost. The basic factor on our 
minds ho\vever is the undiscountable fear that there will be no 
stopping point between a limited and all-out war?2 Not only does 
no one know how to fight a tactical nuclear war~3 a variety of 
Presidential inhibitions could prevent him from pushing the but-. 
ton •. Philip Dyer has studied this problem and pronounced that 
tactical nukes will never be used hecause their will never be 
enough support from the public or sufficient troop jeapardy" to 
warrant a gample that could coneeivably destroy the two strongest 
civilizations on earth?4 On the former point , he is supported 
by a 1969 Time-LouJ.s Harris Poll which showed that only 17~~ of 
the American people w01J~d use nukes in the defense of Canada and 
an even s::naller 8% .would risk~it for We st Germany?5 Citing a 
tendency for the President to make minimal decisions that will 
stir up the least antagonism Dyer claims that resisting by con-
v-entional means will be the only possible consensual decision. 
He concludes by asking the following question. Compared to what 
use of force would the use of tactical nuclear· weapons be the 
l ess fearful alternative?66 
it:67 
As former Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard puts 
With the uresent nuclear balance the United States wou.ld 
not use its nuclear forces against the Soviet Union short 
of a dire threat to the survival of the United States. 
, 
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NEW TECHNOLOGTES .AND THE STRATEGIC BALANCE 
In the atomic age , advanced technology has often had a 
negligible influence on the overall nuclear balance between the 
United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. While 
the l atter has continually conceededscientific superiority to 
the West , she has still managed to effectively translate lesser 
and even archaic equipment into an adequate deterrent force . In 
fact , it would take an extaordinary technological advantage by 
one side to give it a chance at emerging victorious from a strategic 
exchange . 
Why them is it essential for any discussion of p:ossible 
future Soviet-American nuclear rellationships to examine the 
scientific products. of tomorrow? For one thing, defense planners 
are constantly coming up with worst-case analyses that predict 
major technological breakthroughs of enough significance so as 
to convince the enemy that he can launch an assured destruction 
attack \",hile limiting d~age to himsE~lf. And secondly, new de-
velopments in weapons systems could have a drastic effect on 
crisis stability, either beca~se o~ulnerability or because they 
appear t o signal first-strike intentions. I wish only to present 
an overvies of impending technology as it relates to the two 
factors stated above. 
At present, both superpowers do not foresee any ma j or tech-
nological breakthroughs that will upset the strategic balance to 
an appreciable extent~ Although no information on Soviet per-
( 93 ) 
ceptions is available , krnerican scientists have concluded that 
there 'will be no new revolutionary discoveries in rs.dar jarnming~ 
nuclear wee.pons teCh.:."1ology~ or anti-submarine warfare~ It is 
perhaps this last belief, that there will be no way to simulta-
neously destroy an entire SSBN force, which most reassures the 
continuation of deterrence. 
As for the great ICBM accuracy race that has been waged 
with vigor for the past fifteen years , we are nearing the end 
of the line where, in another fifteen years, Nature will_step in 
and declare a ·truce . There is simply a physical limit to CEP 
improvement, the accepted figure being .30 feet without som.e sort 
of terminal guidance: 
In . the last few years, much has been said about the potential 
revolutionizing effects of lasers on the science of warfare , and 
indeed , both the United States and the Soviet Union have under-
teken extensive laser programs , however at the present time, no 
solid predictions can be made? The speculate~ military nossibil-
ities of these devices run the gamut of war-fighting as we now 
know it and at some future date, one can not discount the chance 
that a nation might construct an impregnable defense. Any real 
fears though, are premature because difficul t ies relating to 
wieldiness , practicality, and cost now appear to be insurmountable! 
The Soviets believe that an adequate defense must be kept up 
to date wi thfu...YldaInentally new weapons, even, as has already been 
mentioned , if these weapons appear destabilizing to the other side~ 
Thus it follows that the Russians have attached great imnortance 
to technology, and particularly to achieving parity with the 
Westr At present,they greatly lag in this vital ar~ a , a fact 
which was demonstrated. when the Israelis evaluated their latest 
equipment captured from the Egyptians and discovered that tube s , 
and not transistors were being utilized~ However, on the horizon, 
the Soviets have a number of defense programs that will either 
equal or exceed U.S. capabilities. 
The continual Russian interest in modern ICBMs has paid 
off handsomely in the last few years but a number of further 
advances are still to be expected as the results of their am-
bi tious MIRV program become available. A fiul tipl e warhe8.d system 
for the SS-N~8 SLBM will be deployed before the end of the decadelO 
as will a similarly configured mobil~ IRBM~l 
Looking ahead to the 1980's, we can expect the Soviet s to 
introduce follow-up ICBms to supplant or even replace tho se intro-
duced in 1914 . and 1915~ 2 These missiles will have a CEP of one-
tenth mile and be able to deliver several one-megaton warhead s 
or 25-fifty kiloton warheads, giving them a 95% kill probability 
against 3500 psi silos~3 The total number of land and sea-based 
MIRVs will be approximately 1,000~4 a force sufficient in size 
and effectiveness to jeapardize the. American fixed ICB!!1 deterrent. 
'.rhe implic a tions of this vvill be reviewed in the concluding chap--
ter. 
Other notable scientific endeavors that have been discus.sed 
or tested by the Soviets include device s to neutralize U.S. mili-
tary spacecraft yvhilein orbi t;-5 satellite s able to destroy ICBMs, 
and a missile protection system which operates by discharging 
high speed asphc::d t particles above silos~6 These first two progra"Ils, 
if made operational, cotud be successfully countered by saturation 
and the third has been declared infeasible by American 2..'1.alyists . 
The project Americans are ba~king on for the future is a 
fourth dimension to the Triad: a projectile called a cruise mis-
sile which uses aerodynamic lift and propulsion and for the most 
part, remains within the earth' s atmosphere~~ The cruise misiile, 
which has already been flo'vvn in an air-launched version (ALC~,n;-8 
can be deployed from naval vessels, submerged submarines, mobile 
ground launchers, and aircraft~9 It . is subsonic, capable of long-
range, relatively chea:p, extremely accurate , and virtually invul-
nerable to radar detection because of its tiny cross-section 
. tOOl 0 20 and low o~era lng cel_lng. These are outstanding credentials 
to be sure, however the cruise missile has sparked a debate which 
has involved the Armed Forces and Congress as Ylell as the entire 
negotiating position of the United States at SALT talks. 
,Proponants of the cruise missile have stressed the afore-
mentioned qualities of the weapon- as reason enough for its in-
corporation into the'United States deterrent force . They add 
that defending against it, after it has been launched from a 
plane flying outside Soviet terri tory and carrying as ma...'1Y as 
100~1 would be a tremendous eXtJense~2 Finally, those who support 
the cruise missile say that it will raise the nuclear threshold 
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by virtue of the fact that given it s potential accuracy, it can 
replac e tactical and even strategic atomic warheads with conven-
tional one s ~3 For exw~ple, a terminally-guided non-nucl ear ALCM 
could, with a penetrator warhead , att'ack herdened silos and cOIIlInand 
posts~4 
Opponents of these weapons cite various other projects such 
as the B-70 and the YF-12A which similarly were outstanding pieces 
of military equipment but which simply did not provide enough of 
an increment over forces already in existance . In short, it i .s 
claimed that the cruise missile will be susceptible to manned 
interceptors and SAl'JI s ,. that it has unnecessarily complicated 
the SALT talks, and that it will not raise the nuclear threshold~5 
On this last point, doubt is cast upon the belief that the subs-
titution of large nukes by small nukes or even convehtional ex-
plosives will set limit s on the scope of the conflict ·because 
the Russians ' will hav,e no idea as to , the nature of the warheads 
coming . at them. 
The United State s now has a 6 to 8 year lead in cruise mis-
sile teChnology26 hovvever our first models are not likely to be 
deployed before the mid-1980 I s~7 The effect of such deployment 
\vill be discussed along with the impact of new Russian ICBMs in 
the next chapter. I should not here that advocates and opponents 
of the cruise missile agree that international restrictions will 
be im~ossible, both for tactical and strategic modes b ecause 
range, payload , and nTh~bers could not be monitered~8 
The director of the Department of Defens e Advanced Research Pro-
· " ' '; '': .. :' 
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j ects Agency has recently reported to Congress that he 29 
cannot recall a period in the past decade 'l'vhen so many tech- -
nological breakthrough$ with potential major impact on 
national security were on the horizon. -
George Heilmeier cited the examples of lasers , new types of geo-
synchronous satellites to detect aircraft as well as missiles , 
new InCL11.ufacturing tech..1'1iques for making jet engines, and others 
out h_e did not elaborate on exactly what impact they wou~d have . 
It is likely that he overstated his case however the United 
States does have .nllinerous promising projects in the works that 
are worth running do~m. 
Self-Initiated At.tack Mi.sqi.le( SIAM )-A missile which could be pre-
positioned and then ·left unattended, launching itself vvhen it 
detected an appropriat'ed enemy aircraft . riIost major componants 
are already being produced for other weapons~O 
688-class Nuclear Ai;tack Submarine-Alre~tdy funded by Congress to 
be purchased at the rate of five ,everiJ two years. Will be the 
world's fastest submarine with Russian SSBNs as likely targets~l 
Extremely Lo';'1 FreO'L).ency (ELF) Communications Progr8..L"Il.,..A commun-
ications network devised to enable us to transmit data to deeply 
submerged subramines . Will be vulnerable so its contributions 
to Am,erican security will proably only last through the first 
stages of a war. ELF will be complimented by 14 el~ctronics­
filled EC-13Gs called Tacoma, however these aircraft will have 
more limited capabilities~2 
Sea-Based or Airborne Antiba:Lli .B.tic Missile Interceptio.n. System 
(SABTI1IS or ABIvlIS)- Former configuration would employ ships 
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equipped with sophisticated radar and 6issiles close to an 
adversaries coast . ICBMs would be intercepted before their 
t erminal phase . ABIr'IIS r't'ould be more effective against SLBMs 
and could also be used to defend other co.untries~J 
Mul tiple . Lc.unch-Point System-It has been proposed that we spend 
1.5 billion dollars per year for the next eight to ten years to 
build thousands of hardened silos within which our ICBMs vlOuld 
be randomly deploye d. If the Russians al so decided to build one , 
or if they opted to place more de.pendence on their SLBMs, they 
would have to sacrifice much of their current throw-v'leight ad..,. 
vantage~4 
Attack Assessment . System. (AAS)-Now being deveolped , A..4.Swill 
give the President a minute report on theextent of nuclear da.mage 
to the United States~5 
Trident II-This advance SLBI:lI will take full advantage of the 
Trident submarine's missil e launchers and v."ill also be equipped 
\-vi th a high accuracy ma..."l1.euvering re-entry vehicle (MARV) which 
has already been successfully tested~6 The Trident system will 
not be en§,angered by any expected Soviet ASW threat and will have 
the ability to destroy hard-sited ICBrvIs~7 To enter the fleet in 
1987~8 
WIX-A completely new ICBThI vvhich will replace Minuteman beginning 
in 1983~9 To be deployed from existing silos, in a mobile cafig-
uration, or perhaps in an air-dropped 40 mode, the MX .... 'li11 be 
MARVed and carry up to 14 h ,41 war~ eaa.s. A hard-target kiJ.l ca.pabili ty 
is assured by its terminal guidance as vvell as i ts ability to 
utilize information on mid-course correction provided by a series 
of 24 geosysnchronous s atellites, soon to be placed in orbit1 2 
other projects being discussed or implemented include improve~ 
ments to, the orbital warning system that will ma..1{e it more re-
liable and less vulnerable to Soviet killer satellites~3 miniature 
destroy-by-impact interceptors which neutralize enemy spacecraft~4 
radar that is unaffected by cloud cover~5 and a B-52 modernization 
refit that will extend its service life by fifteen years~6 
In sum , it should be realized that many · of these ideas now 
in the embryonic or drawing board stage will never actually ma-
terialize for reasons of cost , practicality, or possibly because 
of treaty limitations. However it is fair to say that the ever 
increasing vulnerability of the fixed land-based missile will 
force the United States and the Soviet Union to direct much of 
their technological efforts towards producing new submarines 
and ASW equipment. 
As far as offensive developments are concerned , a big. push 
is likely in the area of depressed-trajectory SLBMs, missiles 
which, when fired close to shore , can give as little as five 
minutes warning time~7 Existing systems lend themselve s to easy 
modific~tion to a low-trajectory mode however the utility of 
such a move i s still open to question18 Without MARV, such SLBlVIs 
would p·ose a distinct danger only to bombers, unhardened command 
and control facilities, and coastal industrial centers, but none-
theless , Qualitative improvements could subsequently be made to 
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produce a very credible first-strike threat . 
Despi te the fact that ocean-wide ASV'l will remain elusive far 
into the foreseeable future , the superpowers will naturally begin 
to feel an increasing sense of vulnerability to the SSBNs as more 
and more empasis is place on sea-based deterrent forces. Suspicion, 
however unwarranted , is an inevitable product ·of the rivalry 
be'tween the United States and the U.S . S.R. and it is only reason-
able to expect a continuous arms race , focused on oceanic strategy 
and propelled by sizable technological efforts . 
(101) 
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FUTURE MAINTENM~CE OF THE STRATEGIC BALANCE 
By now, this paper should have made clear that strategic 
arms are useful only for mutual deterrence. According to Benjamin 
Lambeth: 1 
The United States and the Boviet Union have long since 
reached a plateau in their strategic relationship. Until 
mili tary technology can devise a tru~y effective 8..1'ld credible 
means of neutralizing an adversary's deterrent force, the 
persistance of residual second-strike capabilities in the 
posession of each superpower, the continued uncertainty to 
both regarding the probability of success a first strike 
would have, and the continued unwillingness of either to 
place its society's livelihood on the scale in an attempt 
to find out, will all tend to preserve stabilitJ as a 'sys-
temic' characteristic of the East-West nuclear balance. 
Even"" if one side did manage to acquire a first-strike capability 
in which it Vias highly confident, the prospect of an enemy launch-
on-warning would continue to further deterrence. 
In the last twenty-five years, many military thinkers have 
convinced, themselves that the intensity of the rivalry between 
the Soviet Union and the United States will somehow override the 
logic behind deterrence, leading us to a nuclear confrontation. 
This notion must be totally dismissed and I again emphasize that 
the hope of avoiding any use of atomic ".-"eapons and averting crises 
which could lead to war is one which is fervently he.ld by both 
sides and in fact, this hope is the predominate force behind 
socialist and capitalist doctrine .• 
Chances are, the passage of time will promote deterrence even 
further. With every passing day, the un'tYri tten ban against the 
use of nuclear weapons gains real and symbolic strength, mruting 
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the employment of these devices more unfamiliar, tentative , and 
dangerous~ Questions about the length of a nuclear war , escalation, 
and the efficacy of a first-s-G-rike become more and more formidable 
as they continue unanswered. We can notcompleteiy deny that the 
u.s. and the Soviet Union will ever enter into an armed conflict . 
The fact is , nuclear weapons do exist and therefore they are 
susceptible to being used by a mad...'D.an or by a panic-stricken 
head of state who feels compelled to respond to either an acciden-
tal use by thE}'6ther . side or a deliberate use by a third party 
allied with the other side. 
Like . the military strategists , the· leadership of each super-
power has often been blinded to the real dictates of the strategic 
balance . That this has resulted from t he inevitable tension and 
hostili ty accompan~ling the arms race is understandable however 
the atmosphere is now condusive to change. The next section 
deals with the possibility of the U. S. and the U.S.S.R.tTanslating 
their newly acquired comprehensions of t he nuclear weapon into 
some. meaningful restraints on the technological treadmill . 
The basic purposes of arms control negotiations are: to 
l esson the likelihood of a nuclear war by providing for deterrence 
at a lower level of armaments , to demonstrate to nations of the 
world that national security is best protected by limitations 
and restraint , to divert resources for domestic needs, and to 
reduce insecurity andtensions~ ~n addition, the dialogue itself 
and the exchange of information is important to a mutual under-
standing of each negotiators position, even if no agreements are 
reached~ 
That the Americans and the Russians want and need arms con-
trol is indisputable however the precise meaning of talks' between 
the two has remained rather obscure. The United States, with some 
notable exceptions, has succumbed to the temptation to build 
any weapons system that the scientists tell us.is possible, a 
philosophy which stemmed from a fear that the Soviets would not 
restra.in themsleves~ even if we did~ This has put us in a situation 
where6 
we see systems that could have been ommitted, delayed, or 
acquired in smaller quantities without endangering the 
strategic balance; but we do not seem to lack systems we 
nOv"l need. 
Arms control talks negates this tendency to uninhibitedly pur-
chase military equipment by providing for bilateral limitations. 
The widespread disenchantment regarding American negotiations 
with the Soviets does not come from the "if it can be made, it 
will be made " school, but rather, fr'om those who feel we are 
bargaining on a unilateral basis instead of a bilateral one . 
The recent spirit of detente has 'resulted in obsdrvers con-
eluding that Russian participation in SALT is indicative of a 
true slowing of the aTIns race , a genuine effort on the part of 
the Kremlin for rapproachment with the ' We.st , and a host of other 
things . This has led to a constant dilemma in evaluating Soviet 
.actions which are clearly not in lin,e with such hopeful reasoning . 
For example , The New York Times , in reporting the annual parade 
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held on the anniversar~r of the Socialist Revolution, stated that 
u.S. intelligence officials had been unable to determine if the 
absence of ICBMs in the largely military procession reflec t ed 
Russian feelings of relaxed international tensions or a nlea by 
Moscow' s mayor to spare the city's brittle cobblestones? 
The Soviet Union does want both qualitative and quantitative 
arms controls and they have said so in no uncertainterms~ often 
asking for no l ess than a complete ban on nuclear devices~ Vfuat 
prevents her objectives from seeing the light of day i s her be-
lief , stemming from the Marxist doctrine, that the West is natur-
ally hostile. and seeking to undermine socialist societies . In 
other words, the Soviets regard all bridge~building as deliberate 
capitalist provocations~O and therefore , as I have spelled out 
in an earlier discussion of detente, they se"ek arms limitations 
talks as a forum in which to gain an advantage over the enemy. 
As the Russians view things, the U.S . wants a "peaceful dialogue 
with them because of a combination of Comm~~ist strength and a 
crisis in the NATO allifu"'1ce~l 
Wi th this in mind, one might 1;vell ask if arms control can 
serve as a viable means of stabilizing deterrence. In answering 
this question, it Vlould be most helpful if we began with a look 
at what the SALT talks and other forms of East-West dialogue can 
clearly not do. Negotiations \'vill never put an end to the arms 
race because , for one thing, it is impossible to place limita-
t ionson research and development (R&D), and furthermore , neither 
side can be comnelled to forgo a major weapons system that it 
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feels it must have . It can also be said that in no way will a 
s eries of arms limitations promote detente, a fact evidenced by 
Soviet military initiatives in Angola and their development of 
Backfire and five nevv ICBms occuring simultaneously wi th SALT~ 2 
Strangely enough, the negotiating process often has a neg-
ative affect on nuclear stability. A nation may~develop new 
systems solely for use as bargaining chips~3 New systems may 
also be generated after comparisons of the rival force postures 
produces unwarranted concern as to ones vu~nerability. Arms 
negotiations also tend to place undue stress on improbable scen-
arios .like a first-strike instead of the more likely ones such 
as accidents~4 Finally, these talks can often bog doy'm in less 
than crucial details, 'something which ~etracts from an understanding 
of/;vhy one y;Jas motivated to bargain in the first place. 
Is, then, arms control a necessity for both superp0V'iers? 
The answer I believe is ' yes '. A strong case is made by the past 
agreements ratified by the U. S. and the U.S.S.R.-a banning of 
nuclear weapons from the seabed(1971), a bal"'..ning of nuclear wea-
pons from Antarctica( 1959 ), a banning of "nuclear weapOns from" 
. . It:; 
outer space, celestlal bodle s , ahd the " moon(1967),~ the atmos-
pheric test-ban treaty(1963) , and a prohibition against placing 
atomic devices in Latin America(1968)~6 These prove the feasi-
1;Jility of constructing arms restraints palatable to both sides. 
Recently, skepticism about the utility of arms treaties for 
the United States has been aired because of apparant Soviet vio-
lations of the SALT-I and Vladivostok agreements. These abrogations , 
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made partially in response to Chinese military pressure , have 
not been total and certainly not of sufficient magnitude to affect 
the overall strategic balance~ 7 I 'vvould argtle that unless we enter 
into a treaty that sustains the ver-:f essence of deterrence , some~ 
thing we should never do because it migh lessen stability, the 
benefits of compliance would far outweigh the disadvantages of 
partial· abrogation. The Soviet Union has traditionally honored 
its agreements18 and they have very strong reasons for wanting 
to maintain an atmosphere in which they c~1'l draw concessions from 
the United States. AssQ~ing that the Russians decide for some 
reason to rna-lee treaties and then break them , the short term effect 
will for the most part be fruitless because the United States would 
have sufficient time to counter~9 The long term effects would 
be equall;r counter-productive as the latter nation no longer would 
feel inclined to enter ilito agreements that gave superior bene-
· fits or even bilateral concessions to the former . 
Mere believeing in the merits of seeking arms cont.m. must 
be backed up by a 'vvell-reasoned negotiating strategy , something 
which the United States , to its great disfavor, has not had. 
American dilemmas about whether to bargain from strength, and, 
what actions should be accomplished on a unilateral rather than 
a bilateral basis, have not only hindered our efforts against 
the highly prepared Russians, but actually have proven counter-
productive to our goal of. reducing tensions. Both the SALT-l 
and Vladivostok agreements were · ' losely worded and technically 
deficient which forced the United states to attach non-binding 
unilateral interperative statements to the original legal texts . 
These of course have been thoroughly disregarded by the Russians 
. who claim our interpretations are faulty an~ot related to the 
actual treaty. Thus, the United States, having fallen into the 
old trap of converting mere honorable intentions into hard facts 
and then extrapolating this optimisti'c logic to Kremlin. poiicy-
makers, now feels disillusioned with the entire spirit of detente 
and is boosting the military ·even further. 
The nroblem of whether the United States should negotiate 
with the U. S.S.R . in a tough mariner and from a position of . strength, 
or be willing to make large concessions to place some limits on 
the enemy, is of great importance . There is a general concens-us 
that we were able to · ratify the ABM accord because of vastlJT 
superior American technolog'J which the Russiansfel t compelled to 
negate , although it meant their giving up a potentially vast 
defensive system, som~thing they traditionally value~O Yet there 
is a question as to the validity of this exru;nple being converted 
into a firm negotiating principle. 
At the initial SALT talks, we bargained with no defined sel1se 
of what we were after and therefore we were unable to assert our-· 
selves properly. An agreement did emerge, and the Sovi~ts were 
subjected to a set of guidelines, however . our inability to deal 
firmly with specifics enabled the Russians to wield the power . 
e..nd demand concessions , a . fact which left us with a codification 
of U. s. throw-vei..ght inferiority. Henry Rowen has said that2l 
there is a big difference between disparities which floyv 
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from unilateral decisior.s which can be ahanged on the basis 
of ne y'l technology or changed circmnst2nces and our accepting 
in principle an unequal position i nt ended to exist for a 
loT'l..g peri ad of ti:ne . 
vVe must be able to stand up to the Russians in arms control 
bargaining however how this should be done is a mat t er of .increa-
sing speculation. The .'previously mentioned Defense Intelligence 
Agency detente report advised that the U. S. 22 
need not hesitate to demand a clearly comparable price for 
every concession the U.S. or West is prepared to ma..1{e. 
This opinion ste~~ed for the finding that detente has served the 
Soviets well and therefore they are not prepared to lightly jet-
~ison this policy . 
If Vie accept the belief that the United States shou~d be 
equally compensated for all it gives up, 'tie must further examine 
how this is to be done. 
The first rationale would have us promote bilateral arms 
control by matching the Soviets step for step or if possible, 
surpassing them. In the later case, UrS. superiority would be 
used in much the same way as it was during the ABrii negotiations . 
The more moderate view of maintaining essential parity with the 
Russians is based on the hope that the CO~llunists, thwarted in 
their attempts to tip the strategic balance in their favor, will 
rationally want to reduce force l evels. The logic is sound but 
the concessions drawn from the Soviet Union may be offset by the 
rigorous demands this strategy places on the United States~ In 
the long rtU1, our armed forces will be made up of weapons systems 
devised as bargaining chins rather than equipment that is necessary 
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for deterrence , the most cost-effective , and so on . There are 
two reasons for this . First , on occasions where th~ussians are 
not convinced by our show of strength, we vlill ' be stuck with 
equipment we really don't need. And secondly, past experience 
tells us that once defense programs pro~ress to the deployment 
stage , a great .. number of factors combine to ma-1{e eancellation 
exceedingly difficult~3 
Attempts to gain bargaining l everage through the creation of 
strong forces-in-being will not best serve the interests of arms 
control. ' Arriving at a similar conclusion, Ted Greenwood and 
Michael Nacht have written in Foret gn Affairs that 24 
••• linking American weapons development directly to Soviet 
behavior ••• is needlessly constraining future policy choices 
while simultaneously running the risk of building Soviet 
overconfidence in their ability to control Ai"Ilerican procure-
ment decisions. 
The solution then, is arms control t hrough a strategy that 
relies on our potential strength being just aE? persuasive to 
the technology-awed Russ.ians as actual strength. In oth.er words , 
by taking new weapons systems through the initial stages of devel-
opment but then stopping them short of advanced testing and de-
ployment, we will have bargaining chips t hat could affect the enemy 
but. are not binding on ourselves . 
In some cases, arms control agreements ma~" be reached before 
ei ther side. can b egin research and development, ·as was the case 
1,r,ti th the Sea-Bed and Outer Space treaties. In other instances , 
' each C01?.ntry may be proceeding rapidly with a particular weapons 
, system in anticipation of its being ' deployed ylhich will nake it 
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t ougher for agreement s to be reached. In this situation, the 
United States should maintain an aggressive R&D program while 
unilaterally declaring that the fruits of this process yull not 
be made operational if the Sovi ets exercise similar restraints . 
If our lead is not followed , we will be left with two options. 
If we decide after all that U.S . deployment would not add to the 
stability of deterrence, we could simply put a halt to all pre~ 
J]roduction activities, something which would not affec t force 
l evels already in existance. On the other hand, if the weapons 
system is indeed necessary, we can put it into operation in suf-
ficient ouantities to restore the balance and prove to the Soviets 
that their added expenses have heen futile . 
Finally, there may be circumstances where the Russians decide 
to add destabiliz;ing improvements to forces already in eXistance , 
forces which at the time, are basically equalled by the United 
States . Again, this calls for unilateral action by the l~tter 
which is conditional upon its being reciprocated at a later. date . 
If an eque.l number of forces on each side i.s assumed to be the 
strongest contribution to stability, then a freeze on present le-
vels or a:r'maments should be called for. lri other words, the U. S. 
would eschew any improvements to its current hardware if the 
Soviets promised to do the same . The latters failure to comply 
would be a signal to the United States to counter the Co:nnunists 
moves in 8. v:ay that would give us the upper hand in a revised 
status GUO . \Vhil e the gaining of superiority might be 1).!lJlece ssary 
mili tarily 8.S well as a detrem·ent · to cri sis stability , the overall 
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balance would not be so profoundly affected so. as to thre<;l.ten a 
fa:;Llure of deterrence, and the Soviets vvould be taught a lesson 
in counter-productivity that would make the chances for arms con-
trol a lot easier in the future . 
An obvious prerequisite for "Lmilateral arms limitations and 
reductions is a very strong R&D posture by the United States. 
Technology itself is inherently neutral and depending upon the 
use to which it is put, it can either exacerbate the arms race 
or provide for a strengthening of deterrence . America has a sub-
stantial scientific advantage over the Soviet Union, and manipu-
lated properly , it can be our ultimate barga:;Lning chip in seeking 
a slowing dov~m of the arms race. The Russians have never offic-
ially stated that they' would reciprocate if we reduced our de-
fenses~5 however , Dr. Zhores Medvedev, a deported scientist, told 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last year that U. S . ini-
tiative~ in this direction would be followed~6 . 
In trying to harness the arms race , negotiators should keep 
in mind that adherence to treaty provisions must for the most 
part be easily verifiabl e to both sides. This is why the prime 
opportunities for arms control almost always come· before a weapons 
system has been deployed by either side; new technology must be 
tested and this process is observable from e.nemy satellites and 
listening posts. MIRVs are a classical example of· · destabilizing 
equipment becoming operational in numbers which are impossible to 
ascertain by surveillance . 
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There are currently two areas in particular where the United 
States and the Soviet Union must co:ne to an agreement if we are 
to avoid a drastic reshuffling of strategic deterrent forces. 
These are I,IARV and submarine vulner2.bili ty. 
At the present time, only the United States has the requisite 
technology to build mARVs, and initial testing is being conducted 
on a limited basis, however, it must be assumed that the. Russia..l1s 
and 
. will acquire the necessary skills as well/at some point in the 
future, be able to threateri us just as we will be able to threaten 
them. The implications of these warheads on nuclear stability 
is enorr~ous because, if allowed to beco;rle operational, they will 
guarantee theyirnrnediate obselesence of every fixed target, soft-
sited, in the hardest ·of silos, or even embedded in rock. SLBMs 
would have the ability to destroy ICB11s as l;vould mobile and air-
launched missiles, a dim prospect because these offensive systems 
as they currently exi~t or as they are conceived, conribute to 
deterrence by virtue of their inherent lack of pinpoint accuracy~7 
Both the Soviet Union and the United States have the means 
to compensate for the elimination of fixed ICBMs by moving to 
place their deterrent forces aboard submarines and mobile missiles, 
however this is not wholly desirable. The command and control 
liIl_~ between government officials· 8.!ld sublllarines or mobile missile 
unit military personnel is drastically mor:-e weak than that of 
silo-based forces. Thus, the effect o~. crisis stability of 
each SU"DerDOWer believing .in the vi.:.lnerabili ty of its cO:mlunications 
J. • 
system can be readily observed. A policy of la"LIDch-on-';.'arning 
· :. - , , . .. I;. ~ • 
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would be mandated and the worst-case analyist s could paint a 
scenario like thi s : a surprise salvo of MARVed depressed-trajectory 
SLBMs destroys the entire American communications network, ren-
dering us incapable of co~~unicating with our sea-based deterrent, 
mobile mi ss ile unit s , or our early warning satellites. fIloments 
later, the Soviets launch an attaok on our mobile missiles and 
remaining fixed missiles with their MARVed ICBMs. They have 
been keeping careful tabs on the location of the mobile forces 
through their recon satellites so they are able to re-target their 
missiles to hone right in on ours. The U.S. 1.S left with no 
land-based strike weapons (the bombers having been destroyed by 
the initial SLBMs) and without any way of commu.nicating V'rith the 
sub force. The Russians then proceed to . attack Western Europe 
wi th a wide range of c'onventional, tactical and strategic nuclear 
forces, destroying half of it but taking full control by para-
chuting in thousands of troops. She then warns the United States 
that when communications are restored, any SLBM attack on the 
9-0viet Union will result in the destruction of American citie s . 
This scenario is ridiculous for a nTh~ber of reasons. To name 
just one, there can be no iron clad guarantee that all the . com-
munication links and all th~ombers and all the mobile missiles 
will be destroyed. But a nuclear holocost isnot something to be 
taken lightly-it can mean the e.nd of everything we hold -dear to 
us-and even though deterrence will almost certainly be maintained 
'Hi th or \7i thout MARVs, we should not allo1;'1 ?ursel vesto be placed 
in a situation where peace is sutained at barely minimal levels. 
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Al though high levels of ue t errence are theoretically uP~~ecessary , 
if we can dou1:ELy or triply insure that the risks of using nuclear 
weapons remain great, this extra protection must be considered 
worthwhile. 
Whether or not the U~S. and Russia deny themsleves the use 
of mfL.'1.el..J.vering re-entry vehicles, increasingly accurate mIRVs 
will continue to make fixed ICBMs more and more vu~nerable to a 
first strike. As this occurs, increasing numbers of deterrent 
forces will put to sea where the offense has a distinct advantage 
over the defense . Nevertheless, it will only bea matter of time 
before som.e ASW advances are achieved and strategists begin to 
worry about submarmine vulnerability, producing a new .... vaye of 
uneasiness and arms building. 
To avoid this problem which is always recurring b ecause no 
one is ever really confident in deterrence , it has been proposed 
that sections of the ocean be designated as s,anctuaries , available 
to thE?fuilitary forces of one but not both of the superpowers~8 . 
This would allow' SSBNs to cruise freely without fear of ASW c:l.r1d 
provide for an assured second-strike capability no weaker than 
the ship-to-shore cormnand and control link. UI1~awful incursions 
by one side into the others sanctuaries could be easily detected 
so there is reason to believe that this type of agreement would 
not be abrogated. Because of the need for precise-definitions 
of boundaries, incll1.ding the geographical dimensions, and the 
airspace above it, a submarine sanctuary agreement does not lend 
itself to a unilateral declaration by the United states . There 
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.... 
has been nothing written in public to suggest that this t opic has 
ever been discussed by America and the U.S.S . R. 
At this point, we should be able to draw some conclusions as 
to the future force posture that will draw the United States and. 
the Soviet Union farthest away from any temptation to use nuclear 
weapons. This concluding section contains my recommendations on 
how the former can direct itself and the Russians towards a stable ' 
peace. I repeat once more that all odds favor the unbroken con-
tinua...."1ce of deterrence and that my proposals ar.e merely designed 
to overwhelmingly convince ourselves and our enemy ·of this fact. 
The American strategic Triad has served us well in the past 
however it is now in I+eed of revamping.. SLBMs are rapidly becoming 
the greatest single hedge against a 'pre-empti veattack arid thv.s 
should be retained however I propose that we graduall;wPhase 01,lt 
the manned bomber fleet t scrap the cruise missile program, B.nd 
reduce our dependence on fixed ICBids by making the MX ava'ilable 
in either a land-mobile or silo-base'd mode. 
My stance on the sea-based deterrent needs no elaboration . 
As long as we continually update the commu..'l1.ications · lin..'k: behveen 
submarines and land, the U.S. vlil.l place a great deal of trust 
in the SSBN, trust which leads to confidence which in turn pre-
cludes our doing anything rash during a· crisis. . Furthermore, 
although the possibility is remote, any breakthroughs in ASW 
will be easily detected and thus subject to neutralization or 
abolishm.ent by treaty . 
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It iB alvvays hard for a branch of the Armed Forces to give 
up a senti'llental. favori te, the battleship being a case in point , 
however the strategic balance and weapons technology .have e\doved 
to a degree which eliminates any need for manned bombers . Current 
justification for the B-52 and the forthcoming B-1 centers around 
three factors : marked Soviet fear of these vveapons which is evi-
denced by their massive defenses and their behavior at the SALT 
ta1:ks~9 the 'reinforcement aircraft give to the missile tnreat':O 
and the need for an alternative to missiles should the Soviets 
violate the ABM treaiy~l These are valid considerations 'however 
it is evident that the danger of Soviet existing and potential 
counteractions more than outweigh the planes contribution to the 
United States deterrent force. 
It follows that . the Russians are going to do every thin pos-
sible to eliminate the source of their fear, fu~d so far, this flas 
manifesteli itself in the collossal air-defense network protecting 
the U.S.S~R. It also follows that if the United States goes ·ahead 
vvi th a new system, the B-1, which is designed to penetrate enemy 
airspace with greater effectiveness, the Soviet Union will meet 
the increased threat with nev" systems of her 0%"1. These may take 
the form of stronger homeland defenses, but then again, because 
of the acknowledged U. S. lead in electronic counter-measure', tech-
nology , she may look for more success in finding ways t o destroy 
the hombers before they leave the ground. This means that the 
B-1 will serve as an invitation to the Soviets to develop de-
pressed-trajectory missiles or other me thod~ of attacking the 
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United States , a prospect we surely wish to avoid . 
The argument that missiles and bombers reinforce each other 
in the Triad is harder to disco~mt . If a Soviet strike was de-
signed to simultaneously destroy the two , advance warning of the 
Comrnunis.t ICBM launch Vlould enable our bombers to take off and 
avoid destruction from SLEMs. And if Russian ICBMs and SLBMs 
were fired simultaneously, our missiles will have ·· time to~·take 
flight. Furt~ermore, it is said that missiles will cl~ar the way 
for subsequent bomber attacks on targets not initially destroyed. 
Why then phase out this portion of the U.S. offensive forces? 
There are several reasons. An American military posture that 
only includes missiles significantly reduces the threat from 
Russian SLEMs which are not . able to destroy hard targets. rfIore-
over, the elimination oiibombers will still leave the Soviets . with 
the massive problem of simultaneously destroying our ICBMs and 
our fleet of Poseidon. and Trident submarines, provided of course 
that we have already opted not to ride out the attack a..."'1d to 
It is calculated that twenty percent of the land and sea-
based missiles of either side will fail to complete their mission 
due to guidance system failures, the inability of the warhead to 
explode , or the initial incapacitation of the rocket engines~2 
When the effect of fratricide is t acked on, it is clear beyond 
a shadow of a doubt that a Soviet firs-strike will fall short of 
knocking out . all , or even close to all of our fixed ICBms. The 
same holds true for our cOInmunications links with the SSBNs. 
(120 ) 
Just as a Rus$ian use of MARVs would not render ther:;, immune 
from the problems associated 'ivi th less than 1001~ weapons reliability, 
a Soviet decision to abrogate the provisions of the SALT-l accord 
and deploy an ABWf system would not give them a ' remote chance of 
intercepting ail our missiles . On this basis, any presumption 
th'at we need bombers as a hedge against a Soviet ABliI threat is 
inherently faulty. First of all, a Soviet dec'ision to break the 
treaty would sabatoge their efforts to ' harness A.."!lerican nuclear 
capabilities as the latter would no longer be willing to enter 
into any agreements . Secondly, Soviet ABM deployment on a scale 
necessary to defend the entire couritry will, provide strong in..., 
centive to the United States to do likewise, something the Russians 
do not want because of ' our technological lead in this area. Fi-
nally, it is believed that both the Galosh and Sa.feguard ABM 
systems are largely ineffective and therefore incapable of ,pr.e-
venting large scale damage~3 Eve~ worst-case analyists conceiving 
of a reliable 8....11.ti-missile defense would also be forced to admit 
that such a system is subject to saturat ion by increased n~"!lbers 
of U. S. laT:J-nchers. 
In eliminating m8....~ed bombers from the force structure, we 
should be a,;vare that this move might be u sed to gain concessions 
from the Soviet Union. Rather than publicly announcing our plans 
to retire the B-52s 2nd cancel the :a-I project, the Unite,d States 
c01J~d attempt to negotiate a link betvveen these actions and limits 
on the Backfire , or preferably, depressed .... trajectory SLB~:s . AI-
though we v:ill eventually scrap our bombers whether or not the 
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Soviets reciprocate , it is werth a try a t curbing the arms race. 
If the U.S. can keep its intentions secret , itwould be in 
a strong position to make the proposed demands. With certain 
modifications , the B-52s have a potential service life of fifteen 
more years . As for the B-1 , a number of prototypes are now flying 
however a firm production decision is yet to be made . Should the 
project be cancelled and subsequently the U.S. felt ' a great 
need for bombers, it could be resurrected, and in a far shorter 
time than it would take the Soviets to build a nation-wide ABM 
system. 
The land-based missile segment of t he American strategic 
offensive Triad, while' on the whole more vulnerable than our sea-
based forces, is thE7fuost essential contributing factor to deter-
rence because it promises practically unthinkable destruction 
from large and accurate megaton devices . This is not to imply 
that bombers and SLBMs are incapable of inflicting enough damage 
to support deterrence. It is just that the existance of single 
pieces of hardware that can kill millions of people has been more 
influential in convincing both sides that deterrence is real than 
its less Dotent counterDarts in the Triad. J . _ 
I have already pointed out that land-base.d missiles are 
becoming more and more vulnerable, just as I have mentioned that 
the limits · of this vulnerability vvill further the maintenance of 
deterrence . However, I believe that changes in our missile de-
ployment are necessary. 
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In kee:ping with the notion that deterrence should be ' doubly 
or triplelJ insured, the United States must make an effort · to 
eliminate some of the 1054 fixed ICBIvIs and replace them 7ri th rnis-
siles which are land-mobile. At present, · Vie do not know a great 
deal about mobile ICBMs , however indications are that they will be 
invulnerable to all but very advanced cruise missiles and bombers 
on armed reco~~aiss~~ce flights, both of which can be adequately 
countered. 
The ability of mobile missiles to ride out an attack will 
obviously give the President an opportunity t o delay a retaliatory 
second-strike , thus avoiding a strategy of launch-on-warning. 
Furthermore, these weapons, in allowing us to decrease the number 
of fixed ICBT'I s , would enable the Soviets to reduce their throw- ' 
weight because they ';'lOuld have fewer targets to hit . Lastl;\{ , it 
ca...~ be marainally argued that a move to less accurate land-mobile 
missiles vlill assure the enemy that we have no first-strilr,e inten-
tions. 
There are drawbacks t o this system but they are not of great 
importance . The biggest gripe about mobile ICBMs is that deploy-
ment by both sides will cause another missile gap due to the' dif-
ficul ty in ascertaining the si.ze of such forces~4 The validity 
of this is open to question for tvvo reasons. For one thing, modern 
methods of satellite surveillance should give each side an appro:x;-
imate idee. of hov; many ICBMs are being carted around the enemies 
t erritory . And sec 'ondly, if both superpowers acquire l~Yld-mobil e 
missiles, numbers will not matter because under any circu.I!lstances 
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they both will maintain an assured sec.ond-strike capability. 
Additionally, mobil e ICBMs may be ha~pered by a less than secure 
command and control link with Washington as well as an inability 
to travel near population centers. While the use of these weapons 
will be' l ess subject to Presidential direction than fixed forces r 
they will be more trustworthy than submarines; the latter problem 
can be avoided by a progra.'TI of warhead safeguarding similar to 
the one used in Europe as well as by careful selection of dispersal · 
routes. 
No matter hovv effective the land-mobile missile will be, the 
U. S. should not replace more than half of the s ilo-based forces . 
Not only are the ICm ... Is we now operate the most securely linked 
portion of . the Triad to cbmman~ and control, they constitute our 
. greatest hard-target kill threat. Srich attribute s can not be 
completely discarded . 
In a, way, the Russians have given us a mandate to deploy 
mobile ICBrils by virtue of their decision to develop these weapons 
themselves~5 Unle ss both sides have them, the added meaning they 
lend to deterrence is lost-a fact which may be an invitation for . 
some sort of agreement requiring a certain percentage of each ' 
nation ' s ICBM force to be operated in a mobile mode. 
In completing the discussion on suggested U. S. force postures 
that will hopefully provide strategic stability in the future , 
it is necessary to pass ju.dgement on the cruise mi-ssile, a weapon 
now in the advanced R&D stage . The relative merits of the se 
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mini9,ture warheads have already been reviewed and I should add 
that the aforementioned manned bomber proposals do not preclude 
a completely independent evaluation of the cruise missile. 
At no point now or in the foreseeable future will the United 
States have a need for the cruise· missile. The penetration ca-
pabili ties of ICBrlIs and SLBIvIs are assured and the improved aCcur-
acy which the ALerlI offers can easily be built into existing forces " 
even -without Iv1ARV~6 In addition, the Soviets can be expected to 
come up with suitable defensive measures by 1985, rendering the 
cruise missile obsolete unless used in great :- -numbers . 
This last point . actresses itself to the assertion made by some 
that the ALCM will raise the nuclear threshold. If they are laQ."'1-
ched on a massive scale , the Russians could not help but recognize 
the U.S. in a hostile manner. Even assuming that a few of these 
weapons, with conventional warheads, are directed at the U. S. S.R. 
before they can updat'i their air defenses,we can not expect the 
Soviets to act calmly when they discover their hardened silos 
being . destroyed. An attack of this kind , whether using nuclear 
or non-nuclear explosives, is simply too risky. 
Would the Soviet Union go to vvar if we used one or tvvo cruise 
an 
missiles to destroy/important military target with a conventional 
warhead? We can not say for sure. It is imaginable that Pentagon 
strategists believe the answer is "no" .and that this wea:90ns would 
-prove- idee.l for demonstrating American resolve in a crisis. I 
ask though: With a consta.Ylt threat of a Russian launch-on-vrarning, 
v-That .possi ble circumstances would require of an armed pro.jectile 
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into the airspace of the Soviet Union? 
Naturally , I have not covered clo s e to all of the strategies 
and weapons 'which make up the nuclear balance. Any complete 
discussion would have to cover alert rates, command, control , 
cOII:m.unications, attack warnings, survivability, systems reliability, 
range, accuracy, and penetration capabili ties~7 Yet these factors 
may be beyond discussion. The risks of trying to fully evaluate 
them-and guessing wrongly':;'are simply too great. There are more 
than eno1...1.gh unknowns about every aspect of nuclear conflict to 
insure t hat deterrence is never deliberately broken by the United 
Stat es or the Soviet Union .. 
What both superpovlers need to understand is not the likely 
scenarios of a nuclear war and thcrbest, preparations for it ; , thlS , 
they can never do. Rather, we need to acquire a broader vision 
of the full implications eminating from the diplomatic and mili-
tary maneuvering which each side engages in. This will helD us 
to wrap deterrence in more identifiable , and thus perBuasive , 
clothes. 
The tmminent vulnerability of ha.rdened mi ss ile silos i s 
going to force major alterations to the force structures of both 
sides. While these changes are being made, motivated as always 
by fear', the dangers of an accident provoking a nuclear war will 
be enhanced . Therefore , the t±me is as. :tipe as ever for dialogue 
between the United States and the Soviet Union. We must come to 
understand that cruise missiles and Backfire bombers are ult i-
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mately inconseauent ial to maintaining deterrence , and hardlY worthv 
L "_ 
of debate. The real i ssued must be brought out of obscurity , 
although I admit that the prospects of the superpowers doing this 
now seem rather dim. 
Whether or not the Sovie t s care t o deal with the sUbstantive 
issues of deterrenc e is a mat t er of con j ecture because no one in 
the West, and possibly no one in the Kremlin, knows for sure what 
goals they seek, both in the Jong and short run. As for the 
United States , we vlillhave to understand that the Russians are 
motivated. t o arm themselves as much because of China as because 
of us. Therefore we must be tolerant if their defensive needs 
differ from our ovm. Furthermore, we must keeu in mind that the 
U. S. S. R. can not possibly regard us in t he same non-belligerent 
l ight as vve see ourselves . Since World War II , the United States 
has introduce d every major weapons system except the ABM~8 
In the history of oivilization, it is eatimated that the. 
total amount of ammunition expended has been 10 rhegatons~9 Today , . 
one missile or bomb contains five times that much. The knowledge 
of preventing their use is as important an issue as the ';'Vorld vvill 
ever face . 
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